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1. INTRODUCTION
In recent years U.S. legislators, courts, and academic commenta-
tors have expended a good deal of energy attempting to define the
proper scope of statutory provisions that authorize minority sharehold-
ers in corporations to apply for dissolution or other remedial relief on
the basis of fraud, oppression or other improper conduct.' Similarly,
most Canadian jurisdictions have recently enacted provisions that au-
thorize the courts to grant remedial relief for oppressive and unfairly
prejudicial conduct.
Canadian courts and academics, and even some foreign commenta-
tors, have considered the Canadian oppression provisions, which have
been referred to as "beyond question, the broadest, most comprehensive
and most open-ended shareholder remedy in the common law world."2
U.S. courts and commentators have, however, almost entirely neglected
Canadian oppression law.' This is unfortunate. Canadian oppression
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1. Articles reflecting these trends include Davidian, Corporate Dissolution in
New York. Liberalizing the Rights of Minority Shareholders, 56 ST. JOHN'S L. REV.
24 (1981); Olson, A Statutory Elixir for the Oppression Malady, 36 MERCER L. REV.
627 (1985); Phillips, A Statutory Proposal Protecting Employment Expectations of a
Close Corporations's Minority Shareholders, 63 WASH. U.L.Q. 545 (1985).
2. The quote is from Beck, Minority Shareholders' Rights in the 1980s, in LAW
SOCIETY OF UPPER CANADA, CORPORATE LAW IN THE 80S 311, 312 (1982), quoted
in Sparling v. Javelin Int'l Ltd. [1986] R.J.Q. 1073, 1077 (Que. S.C.). The Canadian
cases, texts, and articles will be cited infra. Examples of non-Canadian commentators
who have discussed the Canadian oppression remedy and the case law arising under it
include Prentice, The Closely-Held Company and Minority Oppression, 3 OxF. J. LE-
GAL STUD. 417 (1983); J. FARRAR, COMPANY LAW 376-82 (1985).
3. Even the most comprehensive work in the area, F. O'NEAL & R. THOMPSON,
O'NEAL'S OPPRESSION OF MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS (2nd ed.), which discusses the
English law in some detail, devotes only a few footnotes to the Canadian law.
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law provides useful insights into the issues which are confronting, and
will continue to confront, U.S. courts, legislators, and academics. In
order to shed light on these issues, this article will outline the Canadian
experience with the oppression remedy. It will be seen that the broadly
drafted Canadian oppression remedy has had an important impact on
the law relating to minority shareholders and has been a valuable addi-
tion to Canadian corporation law. This article will also identify issues
which should cause concern for U.S. law-makers in relation to the in-
troduction of an open-ended oppression remedy.
2. HISTORY OF THE OPPRESSION REMEDY IN CANADA
Canada, like the United States, is a federal system. Unlike in the
United States, however, the Canadian federal government, as well as
the ten provinces, has the power to incorporate. All eleven jurisdictions
have taken advantage of their constitutional authority and have enacted
general incorporation statutes.4
In the late 1960s and early 1970s the federal government and a
number of provinces established task forces to examine the law relating
to corporations.5 The results were dramatic. In 1970 the province of
Ontario passed a new general incorporation statute. Three years later
British Columbia enacted a new British Columbia Companies Act
(hereinafter B.C.C.A.). In 1975, the federal Parliament passed the Ca-
nadian Business Corporations Act (hereinafter C.B.C.A.). Through the
remainder of the 1970s and in the early 1980s Alberta, Saskatchewan,
Manitoba and New Brunswick enacted legislation modeled closely on
the C.B.C.A. Also, in 1982 Ontario replaced its 1970 statute with one
closely resembling the C.B.C.A. The other four provinces made either
less ambitious or no changes to their general incorporation laws in this
period.'
4. T. HADDEN, R. FORBES & R. SIMMONDS, CANADIAN BUSINESS ORGANIZA-
TIONS LAW 25-31 (1984) [hereinafter HADDEN]; B. WELLING, CORPORATE LAW IN
CANADA: THE GOVERNING PRINCIPLES 32-47 (1984).
5. INTERIM REPORT OF THE SELECT COMMITTEE ON COMPANY LAW (1967)
(Ontario's report) [hereinafter LAWRENCE REPORT]; DICKERSON, PROPOSALS FOR A
NEW BUSINESS CORPORATIONS ACT FOR CANADA (1971) (the Federal report) [here-
inafter DICKERSON REPORT]; D. SHEPPARD & M. SMITH, DEPARTMENTAL STUDY
REPORT OF THE DEPARTMENT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF BRITISH COLUMBIA
(1971); R. BIRD, REPORT ON COMPANY LAW [hereinafter NEW BRUNSWICK REPORT]
(1974); L. BEAUDRY, PROPOSALS FOR A NEW BUSINESS CORPORATIONS LAW FOR
SASKATCHEWAN (1975); INSTITUTE OF LAW RESEARCH AND REFORM, PROPOSALS
FOR A NEW BUSINESS CORPORATIONS LAW FOR ALBERTA (1980) [hereinafter AL-
BERTA REPORT].
6. Ontario Business Corporations Act, ONT. REV. STAT. ch. 53 (1970)[hereinaf-
ter O.B.C.A. 1970]; British Columbia Companies Act, B.C. Stat. ch. 18 (1973), now
B.C. REV. STAT. ch. 59 (1979) [hereinafter B.C.C.A.]; Canadian Business Corpora-
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Those responsible for developing recommendations and specific
legislative provisions borrowed heavily from legislation and reform pro-
posals in other jurisdictions. The two most influential jurisdictions were
the United States and, to a lesser extent, England.' For example, the
U.S. concepts of articles of incorporation and by-laws were introduced
into the C.B.C.A. and the statutes modeled after it.8
Remedies for minority shareholders was another area where a sig-
nificant amount of borrowing from other jurisdictions occurred. Those
responsible for recommending corporate law reform and other commen-
tators widely recognized that the position of minority shareholders was
an unsatisfactory one under Canadian corporate law.9 A large part of
the problem was that the protection for minority shareholders under
the common law was inadequate. The Canadian judiciary, expressly
following their English counterparts, were reluctant to interfere in in-
ternal corporate affairs, and the Canadian common law relating to cor-
porations reflected this. The general rule was, and continues to be, that
directors owed fiduciary duties to the corporation and not to sharehold-
ers directly. Similarly, majority shareholders generally owed no duties
directly to other shareholders. Thus, under Canadian common law,
majority shareholders were prima facie entitled to act in their own self-
interest, even to the extent of being entitled to use their votes in support
of absolving themselves of breaches of fiduciary duty committed as di-
rectors. Further, the general rule was that individual shareholders were
tions Act, Can. Stat. ch. 33 (1974-75), now CAN. REv. STAT. ch. C-44 (1985) [herein-
after C.B.C.A.]; Manitoba Corporations Act, Man. Acts. ch. 40 (1976)[hereinafter
M.B.C.A.]; Saskatchewan Business Corporations Act, SASK. STAT. ch. B-10
(1978)[hereinafter S.B.C.A.]; New Brunswick Business Corporations Act, N.B. Acts.
ch. B-9.1 (1981)[hereinafter N.B.C.A.]; Alberta Business Corporations Act, Alta. Stat.
ch. B-15 (1981)[hereinafter A.B.C.A.]; Ontario Business Corporations Act, 1982, Ont.
Stat. ch. 4 (1982)[hereinafter O.B.C.A. 1982]. The four provinces where less significant
changes occurred were Quebec, Nova Scotia, Prince Edward Island, and
Newfoundland.
7. LAWRENCE REPORT, supra note 5, at vi-vii; DICKERSON REPORT, supra note
5, at iii-iv; Ziegel, The New Look in Canadian Corporation Laws, in 2 STUDIES IN
CANADIAN COMPANY LAW 1, 4-5 (J. Ziegel ed. 1973) [hereinafter Ziegel 2]; Waldron,
The Process of Law Reform: The New B.C. Companies Act, 10 U.B.C. L. REV. 180,
193 (1975); Howard, The Proposals for a New Business Corporations Act for Ca-
nada, in SPECIAL LECTURES OF THE LAW SOCIETY OF UPPER CANADA, CORPORATE
AND SECURITIES LAW 17, 27-28 (1972).
8. The B.C.C.A. utilizes the English memorandum and articles system.
9. LAWRENCE REPORT, supra note 5, at 55-61; DICKERSON REPORT, supra
note 5, at 7, 160-62; ALBERTA REPORT, supra note 5, at 118-49; Elder, Statutory
Remedies of Minority Shareholders in Close Corporations, 3 U.B.C. L. REV. 440
(1966); MacKinnon, The Protection of Dissenting Shareholders, in STUDIES IN CANA-
DIAN COMPANY LAW 507 (J. Ziegel ed. 1967)[hereinafter Ziegel 1]; R. DICKERSON,
THE C.B.C.A.: IMPLICATIONS FOR MANAGEMENT AND THE ACCOUNTANT 18-20
(1977).
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not entitled to bring an action on behalf of the corporation or other
shareholders.
There were exceptions to these principles. For example, case law
from England indicated that majority shareholders were under some
form of duty to cast their votes in the best interests of the company.
Also, an individual shareholder was entitled to bring an action on be-
half of the corporation in certain limited circumstances, such as when
there had been fraud on the minority. Similarly, an action could be
brought by a shareholder in his or her individual capacity if the alleged
conduct constituted a breach of the applicant's personal rights as op-
posed to a wrong to the corporation. Nevertheless, the equitable protec-
tion afforded by the courts was at best erratic and uncertain and at
worst completely ineffective.'"
The legislative protection provided to minority shareholders was
also sparse. There were no statutory provisions requiring the company
to buy out minority shareholders who objected to fundamental changes.
Also, the operation of legislative provisions dealing with the alteration
of class rights was confusing and provided little protection for dissent-
ing class shareholders."
The lack of viable judicial or statutory remedies meant that fre-
quently the only course of action open to a dissatisfied minority share-
holder under Canadian corporate law was to apply to have the corpora-
tion wound-up under statutory provisions that authorized a court to
dissolve a corporation on the application of a minority shareholder. As
in England and the United States, such applications were generally
made in order to resolve the underlying dispute or to help the applicant
withdraw his or her investment rather than with the ultimate intention
of having the corporation wound-up. A winding-up application was far
10. Both Canadian and English authorities have been relied on in the foregoing
summary of a complicated area. See WELLING, supra note 4, at 495-502; HADDEN,
supra note 4, at 251-54; Beck, An Analysis of Foss v. Harbottle in Ziegel 1, supra
note 9, at 545; Anisman, Majority-Minority Relations in Canadian Corporation Law:
An Overview, 12 CAN. Bus. L.J. 473, 473-77 (1986-87); Kaufman, Oppression Reme-
dies: Recent Developments, in 3 CORPORATE STRUCTURE, FINANCE AND OPERA-
TIONS: ESSAYS ON THE LAW AND BUSINESS PRACTICE, 67, 68-73 (L. Sarna ed. 1984)
[hereinafter Sarna 3]; Foss v. Harbottle, 67 Eng. Rep. 189 (Ch. 1843); Beatty v. North
West Transportation Co., [1887] A.C. 589 (P.C.) (Ont.); Ritchie v. Vermillion Mining
Co., 4 O.L.R. 588 (Ont. C.A. 1902); Edwards v. Haliwell, [1950] 2 All E.R. 1064
(C.A.); Cook v. Deeks, [1916] 1 A.C. 554 (P.C.) (Ont.); Nolan v. Parsons, [1942] O.R.
358 (Ont. C.A.).
11. MacKinnon, supra note 9, 't 519-30; F. WEGENGAST, THE LAW OF CANA-
DIAN COMPANIES, 187-94, 323-24, 468-71 (1931); Slutsky, The Division of Power Be-
tween the Board of Directors and the General Meeting in Ziegel 2, supra note 7, at
166, 181-93; Waldron, The Protection of Preference Shareholders in the Closely Held
Corporation, 4 CAN. Bus. L.J. 29, 31-33 (1979-80).
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from a perfect remedy, however. There was no statutory authorization
for alternative remedies and most judges accepted that the courts did
not have the jurisdiction to grant such remedies. Further, though Cana-
dian company legislation most often set out a variety of grounds for
dissolution, including an open-ended clause which allowed dissolution
on the grounds that it was just and equitable that the corporation be
wound-up, Canadian courts, like their English and U.S. counterparts,
operated under the assumption that winding-up was a drastic remedy
to be granted sparingly. For example, in cases brought under the just
and equitable ground, a court would only grant the application if the
facts matched those in classes of cases borrowed from English case law.
These classes were largely oriented toward smaller companies without
publicly traded shares, and even in relation to these companies the
prospects of obtaining a dissolution order were not good."
In order to improve the position of the minority shareholder, those
responsible for recommending company law reforms proposed major
statutory revisions. These proposals were in large measure accepted by
those Canadian jurisdictions enacting new general incorporation legis-
lation. The U.S. influence on this process is very evident. For example,
appraisal rights were introduced in relation to corporate amalgama-
tions, sales of all or substantially all of the corporate undertaking and
some other fundamental changes.1 3 Also, a statutory derivative action
was created which authorized a court to grant leave to an individual
shareholder to bring an action on behalf of the corporation if certain
prerequisites were fulfilled. 4 Further, those responsible for the draft-
12. See Elder, supra note 9, at 444-55; and Huberman, Winding-up of Business
Corporations, in Ziegel 2, supra note 7, at 273. Recent decisions under unreformed
legislation continue to bear out these trends, though the courts may have become some-
what more liberal about granting dissolution applications in relation to the prescribed
classes of cases. See generally Re Rogers and Agincourt Holdings Ltd., 14 O.R.2d 489
(Ont. C.A. 1976); Rafuse v. Bishop, 59 A.P.R. 70 (N.S.S.C. 1979); Re Grimm's Foods
Ltd., 99 D.L.R.3d 377 (Ont. H.C. 1979); Re Graham and Technequip Ltd., 121
D.L.R.3d 640 (Ont. H.C. 1981), affd., 139 D.L.R.3d 542 (Ont. Div. Ct. 1982); B.
Love Ltd. v. Bulk Steel, 38 O.R.2d 691 (Ont. H.C. 1982); Nieforth v. Nieforth, Mac-
kenzie Ltd., 163 A.P.R. 10 (N.S.S.C. 1985).
13. DICKERSON REPORT, supra note 5, at 114-24; SELECT COMMITTEE ON
COMPANY LAW, ONTARIO, REPORTS ON MERGERS, AMALGAMATIONS AND CERTAIN
RELATED MATTERS 52 (1973); NEW BRUNSWICK REPORT, supra note 5, at 292-94;
ALBERTA REPORT, supra note 5, at 48-57, 126-28; O.B.C.A. 1970, supra note 6, at §
100; B.C.C.A., supra note 6, at § 231; C.B.C.A., supra note 6, at § 190; M.B.C.A.,
supra note 6, at § 131; S.B.C.A., supra note 6, at § 184; N.B.C.A., supra note 6, at §
131; A.B.C.A., supra note 6, at § 184; O.B.C.A. 1982, supra note 6, at § 185. See
generally Magnet, Shareholders' Appraisal Rights in Canada, 11 OTTAWA L. REv.
98 (1979); MacIntosh, The Shareholders' Appraisal Right in Canada: A Critical
Reappraisal, 24 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 201 (1987).
14. The prerequisites essentially are 1) the applicant must have asked the board
to bring the action, 2) the action appears to be in the interests of the corporation, and
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ing of the C.B.C.A., borrowing from North Carolina legislation, intro-
duced provisions which required that any alteration of rights related to
a particular share class be approved by the members of that class.
Those dissenting were given the right to be bought out at fair value.
Such provisions also exist in the B.C.C.A. and the statutes modeled
after the C.B.C.A."5
Canadian corporate law reformers looked to England, however,
for guidance with respect to the oppression remedy. The oppression
remedy first appeared in Canada when it was introduced into the
B.C.C.A. in 1960. The provision was borrowed directly from § 210 of
the 1948 English Companies Act. The English provision had many im-
portant faults, and the B.C. provision suffered from the same weak-
nesses. For example, because these provisions were intended primarily
to provide alternative remedies to winding-up, as opposed to introduc-
ing new conduct which could give rise to judicial intervention, it was
necessary for a successful applicant to prove grounds justifying a wind-
ing-up order as well as oppressive conduct. Ironically, it was sometimes
easier to prove the grounds for winding-up than it was to show oppres-
sive conduct within the terms of the provision. This was because the
oppressive conduct had to affect the applicant in his or her capacity as
a shareholder and had to constitute a course of conduct which contin-
ued to exist at the time of the application. 6
Throughout the 1960s and early 1970s, no other Canadian juris-
diction had an oppression remedy and the remedy did not fare well
3) the applicant is acting in good faith. See LAWRENCE REPORT, supra note 5, at 62-
64; DICKERSON REPORT, supra note 5, at 160-62, 164-65; NEW BRUNSWICK REPORT,
supra note 5, at 214-21; ALBERTA REPORT, supra note 5, at 142-44; O.B.C.A. 1970,
supra note 6, at § 99; B.C.C.A., supra note 6, at § 225; C.B.C.A., supra note 6, at §
239; M.B.C.A., supra note 6, at § 232; S.B.C.A., supra note 6, at § 232; N.B.C.A.,
supra note 6, at § 164; A.B.C.A., supra note 6, at § 232; O.B.C.A. 1982, supra note 6,
at § 245; Beck, The Shareholders' Derivative Action, 52 CAN. BAR REV. 159 (1974);
Maloney, Whither the Statutory Derivative Action, 64 CAN. BAR REV. 309 (1986).
15. See DICKERSON REPORT, supra note 5, at 118-19; B.C.C.A., supra note 6,
at §§ 249-51; C.B.C.A., supra note 6, at §§ 176, 190; M.B.C.A., supra note 6, at §§
170, 184; S.B.C.A., supra note 6, at §§ 170, 184; N.B.C.A., supra note 6, at §§ 115,
131; O.B.C.A. 1982, supra note 6, at §§ 169, 184; A.B.C.A., supra note 6, at §§ 170,
184; Waldron, supra note 11.
16. See Elder, supra note 9, at 457-64; Kaufman, supra note 10, at 83-85;
Ravinsky, The Statutory Protection Against Oppression in 1 CORPORATE STRUCTURE,
FINANCE AND OPERATIONS: ESSAYS ON THE LAW AND BUSINESS PRACTICE 51, 57-59
(L. Sarna ed. 1980); Waldron, Corporate Theory and the Oppression Remedy, 6 CAN.
Bus. L.J. 129, 135-37 (1981-82); Nystad v. Harcrest Apartments, 3 B.C.L.R.2d 40, 43
(B.C.S.C. 1986). The problems with the English provision are discussed in O'NEAL &
THOMPSON, supra note 3, at para. 10.12. Despite the restrictive formulation of the
B.C. oppression remedy, successful applications were made in Re National Bldg.
Maintenance, [1972] 5 W.W.R. 410 (B.C.C.A.), and Re Van-Tel T.V. Ltd., 44
D.L.R.3d 136 (B.C.S.C. 1974).
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when it was first scrutinized by those appointed to consider corporate
law reform. Ontario's Lawrence Committee recommended that an op-
pression remedy not be adopted because the concept was a complete
dereliction of the established principle of judicial non-interference in
the management of corporations. The Committee said further that the
underlying philosophy of the remedy had an air of defeatism about it,
as adoption of the remedy was recognition that the legislature could
offer no more to aid minority shareholders than abandoning the
problems to the judiciary to deal with on an ad hoc basis.1"
The views of the Lawrence Committee were in the minority.
When the new B.C.C.A. was enacted in 1973, the oppression remedy
was substantially revised. The revisions were made in accordance with
a number of recommendations made by England's Jenkins Committee
in 1962. The requirement that grounds for winding-up exist for there
to be a successful application was removed. The type of conduct for
which relief could be granted was widened to include unfair prejudice.
It was also specified that a single act could give rise to a successful
application, and that unfairly prejudicial conduct did not have to exist
at the time of the application for the application to succeed. Finally, the
types of relief which could be granted were expanded. Ten specific
types of orders which could be made were specified and it was provided
that the court had the authority to make any other order it deemed
proper. Some examples of the orders which can be granted under the
B.C. provision include cancelling or varying any transaction or resolu-
tion, regulating the company's affairs in the future, appointing a re-
ceiver, requiring a buyout of any shareholder's shares, and winding-up
the company.18
The authors of the federal proposals also recommended the intro-
duction of an oppression remedy. The result was what is now § 241 of
the C.B.C.A. Section 241 contains the revisions which were incorpo-
rated into its counterpart in the B.C.C.A., but the C.B.C.A. oppression
remedy is broader in a number of respects. The class of potential appli-
cants is wider. Both acts permit applications by persons the court deems
proper. Under the B.C. act, however, only present shareholders are ex-
pressly authorized to apply. Under the C.B.C.A. past shareholders,
other security holders, former and present directors and officers of the
17. LAWRENCE REPORT, supra note 5, at 60.
18. B.C.C.A., supra note 6, at § 224; Ravinsky, supra note 16, at 59-60; Nystad
v. Harcrest Apartments, 3 B.C.L.R.2d 43; F. IACOBUCCI, CANADIAN BUSINESS COR-
PORATIONS: AN ANALYSIS OF RECENT LEGISLATIVE DEVELOPMENTS 201-07 (1977).
The full title of the JENKINS REPORT was REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON COM-
PANY LAW AMENDMENT (1962).
19881
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
U. Pa. J. Int'l Bus. L.
company and the administrative official with responsibility for the Act,
referred to as the director, are expressly authorized to apply. Further,
there is a third class of conduct which can give rise to relief: conduct
which unfairly disregards the interests of the applicant. Moreover, con-
duct of an affiliated corporation can also give rise to a remedy. Also,
while the B.C.C.A. stipulates that the impugned conduct must affect
the applicant in the capacity of member (shareholder), the C.B.C.A.
provides that the impugned conduct can affect the applicant in the ca-
pacity of security holder, creditor, director, or officer. Finally, the list of
remedies which are specifically authorized is somewhat broader under
the C.B.C.A.' 9 All of the provinces which have adopted statutes based
on the C.B.C.A. have enacted an oppression remedy which closely re-
sembles § 241. This includes Ontario, which did not have an oppres-
sion remedy in its 1970 legislation because it adhered to the recommen-
dations of the Lawrence Report.20
3. JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION OF THE OPPRESSION REMEDY
The new oppression provisions were clearly an invitation to the
courts to abandon their past conservatism and to intervene in intra-
corporate affairs.2 ' The courts, however, have been given relatively lit-
tle guidance as to how to apply the remedy. Their traditional source of
guidance, English case law, was unavailable because England did not
modernize its oppression remedy in accordance with the recommenda-
tions of the Jenkins Committee until 1980.2 Those responsible for rec-
ommending corporate law reform did not provide precise guidelines as
19. DICKERSON REPORT, supra note 5, at 158-63; Beck, supra note 2, at 312-
14; Kaufman, supra note 10, at 79-81; Ravinsky, supra note 16, at 61-64; and
IACOBUCCI, supra note 18, at 204-10.
20. M.B.C.A., supra note 6, at § 234; S.B.C.A., supra note 6, at § 234;
N.B.C.A., supra note 6, at § 166; A.B.C.A., supra note 6, at § 234; O.B.C.A. 1982,
supra note 6, at § 247. The Ontario provision is actually broader than the federal
provision because it specifies that threatened conduct can give rise to relief. Levin, The
Ontario Business Corporations Act, 1982-Transitional Considerations in Sarna 3,
supra note 10, at 53, 62-63.
21. DICKERSON REPORT, supra note 5, at 162; WELLING, supra note 4, at 526-
33; IACOBUCCI, supra note 18, at 208.
22. The fact that the case law under § 210 could provide only limited guidance
was recognized in cases like Re Sabex Internationale, 6 B.L.R. 65 (Que. S.C. 1979);
Journet v. Superchef, 29 B.L.R. 206 (Que. S.C. 1984); Michalak v. Biotech Elecs.
Ltd., 35 B.L.R. 1 (Que. S.C. 1987); Carrington Viyella Ltd. v. Taran (Que. S.C.
1983)(unreported). The new English oppression provision was in Companies Act,
1980, 28 & 29 Eliz., ch. 18, § 75, and is now at § 459. On the new English provision,
see O'NEAL & THOMPSON, supra note 3, at para. 10.13. A significant body of case law
is now emerging under the new English provision. See Hannigan, Section 459 of the
Companies Act 1985 - A Code of Conduct for the Quasi-Partnership?, LLOYD'S MAR.
AND COMM. LAW Q. 60 (1988).
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to how the oppression remedy was to operate. The most comprehensive
statement on the matter was made by the Dickerson Committee, which
formulated the proposals for reforming the federal corporation legisla-
tion. The Dickerson Report cited examples of freeze-out techniques as
instances where the courts might intervene, suggested that the remedy
would be invoked more frequently in relation to closely held corpora-
tions than other corporations, and indicated that a broad standard of
fairness should be invoked in applying the remedy.23 Canadian aca-
demic commentators have added little to these observations. It is widely
agreed by academic writers that the oppression remedy cuts across
traditional corporate law doctrines and should be interpreted in accor-
dance with broad standards of fairness and ethical business behavior.24
However, attempts to develop a more rigorous theoretical framework,
such as the reasonable expectations analysis which has gained much
attention in the United States, have been rare.25
Despite the lack of specific guidance, Canadian judges have gener-
23. DICKERSON REPORT, supra note 5, at 162-63. The following passage from
Elder v. Elder and Watson Ltd., [1952] Sess. Cas. 49, 55 (H.L.) was quoted with
approval:
[T]he essence of the matter seems to be that the conduct complained of
should at the lowest involve a visible departure from the standards of fair
dealing, and a violation of the conditions of fair play on which every
shareholder who entrusts his money to a company is entitled to rely.
The ALBERTA REPORT discussed the issue in some depth but relied heavily on the
DICKERSON REPORT and existing case law. See ALBERTA REPORT, supra note 5, at
136-43.
24. HADDEN, supra note 4, at 260-65; WELLING, supra note 4, at 527-30;
Kaufman, supra note 10, at 68, 81-83, 101-02; IACOBUCCI, supra note 18, at 208-10;
Waldron, supra note 16, at 148, 150-52; 1 R. KINGSTON, CANADA CORPORATION
MANUAL 8-25 - 8-26B (1986); MacIntosh, Corporate Governance and Minority
Rights 7 DAL. L.J. 24, 42, 77-81 (1983); Tetrault, Remedies, Offences and Penalties
under the Canadian Business Corporations Act in MEREDITH MEMORIAL LECTURES,
CANADA BUSINESS CORPORATIONS ACT 39, 48-51, 53 (1975). Schaef, The Oppression
Remedy for Minority Shareholders, 23 ALTA. L. REv. 512 (1985), argues that, as
interpreted, the oppression remedy has not displaced traditional corporate law
doctrines.
25. WELLING, supra note 4, at 532-37, has advanced a shareholders' expectation
analysis based on the English case of Ebrahimi v. Westbourne Galleries, [1973] App.
Cas. 360 (H.L.). The possibility of invoking an expectation analysis has also been dis-
cussed by Kaufman, supra note 10, at 82-83. Beck, supra note 2, at 319-20, argues
that the oppression remedy should be interpreted in a manner consistent with the duties
imposed on the majority in United States cases like Jones v. H.F. Ahmanson, 460 P.2d
464 (1969).
Examples of U.S. commentators who have explored the reasonable expectations
analysis in relation to shareholders' remedies include O'NEAL & THOMPSON, supra
note 3, at para. 7.20; Hillman, The Dissatisfied Participant in the Solvent Business
Venture: A Consideration of the Relative Permanence of Partnerships and Close Cor-
porations, 67 MINN. L. REv. 1, 69-75, 83-88 (1982); and Clifford, Close Corporation
Shareholder Reasonable Expectations: The Larger Context, 22 WAKE FOREST L.
REV. 41 (1987).
1988]
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
U. Pa. J. Int'l Bus. L.
ally accepted that the oppression remedy has broadened judicial author-
ity to intervene in intra-corporate affairs and have indicated that they
will use this increased authority in appropriate cases. It has certainly
been recognized that the oppression remedy has limits. It has been
stated that the remedy does not open the door to every disgruntled
shareholder. 6 It has also been said that the remedy does not alter the
basic principle of majority rule and cannot be used by the minority to
abuse the majority." There have even been isolated suggestions that the
law in fact has not been changed to any significant extent by the rem-
edy.28 The dominant viewpoint of Canadian judges, however, is that
the oppression remedy should be interpreted broadly. 9 Most judges ac-
cept that their role with respect to the oppression remedy is to judge
upon the fairness of the actions of management and the majority of
shareholders in order to protect the minority from unfair treatment."
3.1. Procedural Issues
The oppression remedy in Canada, especially as set out in the
C.B.C.A. and the statutes modeled after it, is an open-ended remedy
with few procedural obstacles. Consistent with this, Canadian courts
have generally been unreceptive to arguments which would impose pro-
cedural limitations on the availability of the remedy. For example, it
has been held that an applicant shareholder does not have to have a
minority interest in order to suffer oppressive or unfairly prejudicial
conduct within the terms of the statutory provision. 1 Further, the fact
26. Carrington Viyella v. Taran (Que. S.C. 1983) (unreported); Mason v. Inter-
city Properties, 37 B.L.R. 6, 29 (Ont. C.A. 1987); Bernard v. Montgomery, 36 B.L.R.
257, 261 (Sask. Q.B. 1987).
27. Mason v. Intercity Properties, 37 B.L.R. 6, 29 (Ont. C.A. 1987); H.J. Rai
Ltd. v. Reed Point Marina (B.C.S.C. 1981) (unreported); Brant Invs. Ltd. v. Keeprite,
Inc., 37 B.L.R. 65, 99-100, 108-09 (Ont. H.C. 1987); Bosman v. Doric Holdings Ltd.,
6 B.C.L.R. 189, 191-92 (B.C.S.C. 1978).
28. Eiserman v. Ara Farms Ltd., 44 Sask. R. 61, 70-1 (Sask. Q.B. 1985).
29. Sparling v. Javelin Int'l Ltd., [1986] R.J.Q. 1073, 1077-78; Mason v. Inter-
city Properties, 37 B.L.R. 6, 12, 29 (Ont. C.A. 1987); Re Ferguson and Imax Systems
Corp., 43 O.R.2d 128, 137 (Ont. C.A. 1983); Chrysler Canada Ltd. v. Richmond
Plymouth (B.C.S.C. 1988)(unreported); Re Peterson and Kanata Investments Ltd., 60
D.L.R.3d 527, 542 (B.C.S.C. 1975); Re Bury, 12 D.L.R.4th 451, 453 (Ont. H.C.
1985); Re Abraham and Inter Wide Invs. Ltd., 20 D.L.R.4th 267, 275 (Ont. H.C.).
30. Journet v. Superchef, 29 B.L.R. 206, 223 (Que. S.C. 1984); Diligenti v.
RWMD Operations, 1 B.C.L.R. 36 (B.C.S.C. 1976); Re Little Billy's Restaurant, 45
B.C.L.R. 388 (B.C.S.C. 1983); O'Neill v. Dunsmuir Holdings (B.C.S.C. 1980) (unre-
ported); Johnston v. West Fraser Timber Co., 17 B.L.R. 16, 71-72 (B.C.S.C. 1981),
rev'd, 133 D.L.R.3d 77 (B.C.C.A. 1982) (but discussion of basic purpose of oppression
remedy approved).
31. Carrington Viyella v. Taran (Que. S.C. 1983) (unreported), discussed in
Kaufman, supra note 10, at 97-100; Re Gandalman Investments Inc., 22 D.L.R.4th
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that an applicant's shares were a gift will generally not affect a court's
determination of whether there has been oppressive or unfairly prejudi-
cial conduct. 2 Also, the absence of clean hands will not preclude a
finding of oppressive or unfairly prejudicial conduct.
3 3
The most striking example of judicial resistance to procedural bar-
riers is the B.C. case of Diligenti v. RWMD Operations."' As men-
tioned, under the B.C. oppression provision the oppressive or unfairly
prejudicial conduct must impact on the applicant in the capacity of
shareholder. 5 In closely held corporations a minority shareholder's pri-
mary complaint will often be removal from the board or dismissal from
employment, as opposed to conduct affecting his or her rights as a
shareholder.3" On their face, such complaints cannot give rise to relief
under the B.C.C.A. oppression remedy because of the capacity require-
ment.3' Diligenti held, however, that in certain situations there are eq-
uitable rights, expectations, and obligations between shareholders
which exist independent of the company structure and the relevant leg-
islation. Further, these rights, expectations, and obligations belong to
638 (Ont. H.C. 1986). In Re Gandalman, Judge Callon specifically refused to follow
Vedova v. Garden House Inn Ltd., 29 B.L.R. 236 (Ont. H.C. 1985), where it was held
that a 50% shareholder could not apply under the oppression provision because the
remedy was only applicable to minority shareholders.
32. Mason v. Intercity Properties, 37 B.L.R. 6, 25 (Ont. C.A. 1987); Miller v.
F. Mendel Holdings Ltd., [1984] 2 W.W.R. 683 (Sask. Q.B. 1984). This is also the
law in the United States under oppression/liquidation provisions. See, e.g., Gunzberg
v. Art-Lloyd Metal Products Corp., 492 N.Y.S.2d 83 (1985). Indeed, as was pointed
out in Meiselman v. Meiselman, 307 S.E.2d 551 (1983), a shareholder who obtains his
shares by way of gift is often in a worse position because he does not have the opportu-
nity to bargain. See Meiselman, at 558-59.
33. Journet v. Superchef, 29 B.L.R. 206, 224-25 (Que. S.C. 1984); Miller v. F.
Mendel Holdings Ltd., [19841 2 W.W.R. 683, 695-96 (Sask. Q.B.). In contrast, a find-
ing of an absence of clean hands could preclude an application for winding-up by a
minority shareholder. See Huberman, supra note 12, at 316-17.
34. 1 B.C.L.R. 36 (B.C.S.C. 1976).
35. Most U.S. dissolution/oppression provisions do not expressly deal with the
capacity question. Topper v. Park Sheraton Pharmacy, Inc., 433 N.Y.S.2d 359 (1980),
suggests that the failure to deal with the matter may not be a significant barrier to
relief, but in some states, such as New Jersey, South Carolina and Minnesota, it is
specified that the requisite conduct can impact on the applicant in a variety of capaci-
ties. See Olson, supra note 1, at 641-42; O'NL & THOMPSON, supra note 3, at para.
10.14; Exadaktilos v. Cinnaminson Realty Co., 400 A.2d 554 (1979).
36. Prentice, supra note 2, at 420-22; O'NEAL & THOMPSON, supra note 3, at
para. 3.06; Kaufman, supra note 10, at 76-77; Waldron, supra note 16, at 142-43;
Hannigan, supra note 22, at 69; Meiselman v. Meiselman, 307 S.E.2d 551, 557-58
(1983); Topper v. Park Sheraton Pharmacy Inc., 433 N.Y.S. 2d 359, 365-66 (1980).
The Minnesota oppression provision specifically provides that oppression, or unfairly
prejudicial conduct, can apply in the capacity of employee if the corporation involved
has less than 35 shareholders. See Olson, supra note 1, at 641-42.
37. See Re Westbourne Galleries, [1970] 1 W.L.R. 1378 (C.A.); Prentice, supra
note 2, at 421-22; Kaufman, supra note 10, at 76-77; Hannigan, supra note 22, at 69.
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participants as shareholders, so if these rights, expectations, and obliga-
tions are breached, there can be relief granted under § 224. In
Diligenti, the court granted relief to a shareholder who had been re-
moved as a director, relieved of managerial duties, and deprived of the
remuneration flowing from such duties.8
Some have expressed concern that the oppression remedy is in fact
too open-ended and that it may allow applications in situations which
are inappropriate. 9 This might suggest that more statutory limitations
should have been placed on access to the oppression remedy. On bal-
ance, however, leaving the remedy open-ended and allowing the courts
to deal with procedural issues on a case by case basis has proved to be a
sound approach. One reason is that even when Canadian courts have
held that a particular circumstance should not be an absolute bar to an
oppression application, that circumstance can still be relevant to the
success of the application or the proper remedy. Thus, even though
clean hands is not an absolute bar to an application, the conduct of the
applicant is relevant in ascertaining whether there has been oppressive
or unfairly prejudicial conduct and in determining the proper remedy.4 °
Also, the fact that the applicant's shares were a gift can be relevant to
an oppression application in special circumstances.4 x
38. Justice Fulton, in developing his analysis, relied heavily on Ebrahimi v.
Westbourne Galleries, [1973] A.C. 360 (H.L.), where the notion that there were rights,
expectations and obligations which survived the company structure was first recognized
in Commonwealth law. Diligenti will be discussed further infra. The manner in which
the Ebrahimi reasoning was adapted by Justice Fulton is discussed in Slutsky, Com-
pany Law - Minority Rights - Oppression Remedy - Diligenti v. RWMD Operations
Kelowna Ltd. el. al., 11 U.B.C. L. REv. 326 (1977). Diligenti has been discussed or
noted by many authors, including a number outside Canada. See, e.g., Prentice, supra
note 2, at 422-23; FARRAR, supra note 2, at 381; O'NEAL & THOMPSON, supra note
3, at para. 3.06; Hannigan, supra note 22, at 70.
39. WELLING, supra note 4, at 532-33. One case that tends to support this anal-
ysis is R. v. Sands Motor Hotel Ltd., [1985] 1 W.W.R. 59 (Sask. C.A.), where it was
held that Revenue Canada, the federal taxing authority, could apply in its capacity as
creditor. It was held further that Revenue Canada had in fact been unfairly prejudiced.
40. See Mason v. Intercity Properties, 37 B.L.R. 6, 11, 24-25, 29-30 (Ont. C.A.
1987); Eiserman v. Ara Farms Ltd., 44 Sask. R. 61 (Sask. Q.B. 1985). The conduct of
the applicant is clearly relevant under the United States reasonable expectations analy-
sis. The applicant must show that the frustration of his expectations was not his fault.
Hillman, supra note 25, at 80-81; Capel, Corporation Law - Meiselman v. Meisel-
man: 'Reasonable' Expectations Determine Minority Shareholders' Rights, 62 N.C.L.
REv. 999, 1018-19 (1984). Beyond this, the doctrine of clean hands under United
States dissolution/oppression provisions is unclear. The conduct of the applicant has
been treated as irrelevant in some cases, and has been crucial in denying relief in
others. See, e.g., Topper v. Park Sheraton Pharmacy Inc., 433 N.Y.S.2d 359 (1980);
Exadaktilos v. Cinnaminson Realty Co., 167 N.J. Super. 141, 400 A.2d 554 (1979);
Meiselman v. Meiselman, 307 S.E.2d 551 (1983) (Martin, J., dissenting); Gimpel v.
Bolestein, 125 Misc.2d 45, 477 N.Y.S.2d 1014 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1984); Davidian, supra
note 1, at 62-70.
41. See Re Giroday Sawmills Ltd., 49 B.C.L.R. 378 (B.C.S.C. 1983). In this
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Another advantage of the open-ended approach is that limitations
on access to the oppression remedy would increase the likelihood that
the judiciary would impose inappropriate barriers around the remedy.
It is commonly accepted that this is what occurred in relation to the
original English oppression remedy.42 The same might have occurred
in Canada. Even with the open-ended nature of the oppression remedy,
the tendency to impose unnecessary limitations on the remedy has ap-
peared in some cases. For example, even though it is specifically set out
that former shareholders, directors, and officers can apply and that past
conduct can constitute oppressive or unfairly prejudicial conduct for the
purposes of an application, one case held that an application will be
dismissed unless oppression or unfairness exist at the time of the appli-
cation.4 Further, there have been suggestions that the presence of a
contractual buyout procedure may be a bar to relief.44
The notion that statutory limitations on the availability of relief
under the oppression remedy can lead to problematic judicial intepreta-
tions is illustrated by the different treatment of widely held corpora-
tions under the oppression remedies in Minnesota and in Canadian ju-
risdictions. It is widely accepted that judicial intervention on behalf of
minority shareholders is more appropriate in closely held corporations
than it is in other corporations. In widely held corporations, for exam-
ple, the impact of the traditional lack of remedies for a minority share-
holder is often less acute because it is more likely that there is a market
for the shares. Further, in widely held corporations, the shareholder
expectations and understandings relating to employment, management
and other matters which are so often the components of shareholder
dissatisfaction are unlikely to arise. Finally, judicial intervention in
case, a father established a corporation in order to distribute his estate. He subse-
quently reallocated the rights of the future beneficiaries. Justice Taylor held that if
such steps had been taken in a normal commercial corporation, it would have consti-
tuted a breach under § 224 of the B.C.C.A. The special circumstances of the case
entitled the father to act as he did.
42. See supra note 16. See also M. CHESTERMAN, SMALL BUSINESSES 185-89
(1977); L. GOWER, GOWER'S PRINCIPLES OF MODERN COMPANY LAW 665-70 (4th
ed. 1979).
43. Michalak v. Biotech Elecs. Ltd., 35 B.L.R. 1 (Que. S.C. 1987), following
dicta in Sparling v. Javelin Int'l Ltd., [1986] R.J.Q. 1073, 1077 (Que. S.C.). The
reasonable expectations analysis in Meiselman v. Meiselman, 307 S.E.2d 551 (1983),
appears to incorporate some element of a timeliness requirement. It requires that the
applicant's expectations be permanently frustrated. See Hillman, supra note 25, at 79;
Capel, supra note 40, at 1018.
44. Eiserman v. Ara Farms Ltd., 44 Sask. R. 61 (Sask. Q.B. 1985); Bernard v.
Montgomery, 36 B.L.R. 257 (Sask. Q.B. 1987). In the most careful consideration of
this argument, the court held that the existence of a contractual buy-out procedure does
not preclude reliance on the oppression remedy. See Re Bury, 12 D.L.R.4th 451 (Ont.
H.C. 1985).
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widely held corporations may be more objectionable because corporate
operations may be too complex for effective judicial intervention.45
From all this, it might be thought that the oppression remedy should be
limited to closely held corporations. Oppressive or unfairly prejudicial
conduct, however, can occur in corporations which do not fall within
the traditional definitions of closely held corporations. Further, defining
a closely held corporation is a notoriously difficult process.46 Conse-
quently, it is better not to restrict the application of the oppression rem-
edy and let the courts consider the significance of the characteristics of
the corporation involved on a case by case basis.4"
The Minnesota experience bears this out. Minnesota has an op-
pression provision which is the broadest in the United States and which
is similar in scope to that in the C.B.C.A. and the statutes modeled
after it.4 However, consistent with the intention of the drafters that the
provision provide relief primarily to shareholders in closely held corpo-
rations, a number of aspects of the provision only apply to such corpo-
rations, defined as corporations with no more than thirty-five share-
holders. For example, it is specified that a court is authorized to order
the buyout of a shareholder in an action involving a closely held corpo-
ration. This provision proved to be of great significance in Sundberg v.
Lampert Lumber Co.49 In that case, the corporation had over one hun-
dred shareholders. Seventy percent of the shares, however, were held by
members of one family, and it was acknowledged that the corporation
had some of the features of a common law closely held corporation.
The trial court held that the applicants had been unfairly prejudiced
45. A great deal of literature supports the proposition that minority shareholders
in closely held corporations need more statutory and judicial protection remedies than
their counterparts in widely held corporations. Bradley, A Comparative Assessment of
the California Close Corporation Provisions and a Proposal for Protecting Individ-
ual Participants, 9 Loy. L.A.L. REV. 865, 892-902 (1976); Chittur, Resolving Close
Corporation Conflicts: A Fresh Approach, 10 HARV. J.L. & PUB. PoL'Y 129 (1987);
Olsen, supra note 1, at 627-30; O'Neal, Close Corporations: Existing Legislation and
Recommended Reform 33 Bus. LAw. 873, 881-88 (1978); Waldon, supra note 11, at
49-53. Contra Easterbrook & Fischel, Close Corporations and Agency Costs, 38 STAN.
L. REV. 271, 273-77 (1986).
46. See, e.g., Hochstetler & Svejda, Empirical Research Project, Statutory Needs
of Close Corporations - An Empirical Study: Special Close Corporation Legislation or
Flexible General Corporation Law?, 10 J. CORP. L. 849, 877-85 (1985).
47. The problems relating to judicial interpretation of statutory provisions which
are restricted to particular types of corporations are discussed in Karjala, A Second
Look at Special Close Corporation Legislation, 58 TEx. L. REV. 1207, 1259-60
(1980).
48. See generally Olson, supra note 1. North Dakota has a similar provision.
N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-19.1-115 (1988).
49. Sundberg v. Lampert Lumber Co., 390 N.W. 2d 352 (Minn. App. 1986).
The author thanks Professor Dennis Kajala of Arizona State University for bringing
this case to his attention.
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and that their shares should be bought out by the corporation. On ap-
peal the trial court was reversed - even though the Minnesota provi-
sion expressly authorized a court to grant any relief deemed just and
reasonable in the circumstances. The specific reference to buyouts for
closely held corporations in the statute was held to preclude ordering a
buyout for other types of corporation, such as the one in the case before
the court. Thus, because of the type of corporation involved, the appli-
cants were not entitled to a remedy, apparently regardless of the con-
duct involved.
Similar problems have not arisen in relation to closely held corpo-
rations under the Canadian provisions, where there is no express refer-
ence to the type of corporation to which the remedy is applicable.
There have been successful applications in cases involving widely held
corporations. This does not mean, however, that all corporations have
been treated identically under the oppression remedy. As mentioned,
the Dickerson Report recognized that the oppression remedy was not
specifically limited to closely held corporations, but stated that the rem-
edy would be most useful in relation to such corporations. The case law
has followed this pattern. The success rate in cases where corporations
do not have the characteristics of closely held corporations appears to be
lower than it is in cases involving corporations which appear to be
closely held.5" Further, most oppression applications have involved cor-
porations without publicly traded shares. Finally, judicial pronounce-
ments on the topic suggest that the oppression remedy has a wider ap-
plication to closely held corporations.51 Consequently, the oppression
remedy in Canada has provided more substantial protection to share-
holders in corporations where such protection is most needed without
50. The following oppression cases involved corporations which apparently had
publicly traded shares: Michalak v. Biotech Elecs. Ltd., 35 B.L.R. 1 (Que. S.C.
1987)(application refused); Brant Invs. Ltd. v. Keeprite Inc., 37 B.L.R. 65 (Ont. H.C.
1987)(application refused); Sparling v. Javelin Int'l Ltd., [1986] R.J.Q. 1073 (Que.
S.C.)(application granted); Inversiones Montforte S.A. v. Javelin Int'l Ltd., 17 B.L.R.
230 (Que. S.C. 1982)(application granted) (Sparling came at a later stage in the same
proceedings); Alexander v. Westeel-Rosco Ltd., 93 D.L.R.3d 116 (Ont. H.C. 1978)(in-
terim injunction granted); Ruskin v. Canada All-News Radio Ltd., 16 B.L.R. 59 (Que.
S.C. 1981)(interim injunction granted); Goldbelt Mines Inc. v. New Beginnings Re-
sources Inc., 59 B.C.L.R. 82 (B.C.C.A. 1984) (application refused); Jacobsen v. United
Canso Oil & Gas Ltd., 73 A.P.R. 692 (N.S.S.C. 1979)(application refused); O'Connor
v. Winchester Oil & Gas Inc., 69 B.C.L.R. 330 (B.C.S.C. 1986) (application refused);
Re Goldstream Resources Ltd., 2 B.C.L.R.2d 244 (B.C.S.C. 1986)(application
refused).
51. Mason v. Intercity Properties, 37 B.L.R. 6, 12, 23-25 (Ont. C.A. 1987); Re
Ferguson and Imax Systems Corp., 43 O.R.2d 128, 137 (Ont. C.A. 1983); Diligenti v.
RMWD Operations, 1 B.C.L.R. 36, 46-53 (B.C.S.C. 1976); Re Goldstream Resources
Ltd., 2 B.C.L.R.2d 244, 247 (B.C.S.C. 1986); Re Sabex Internationale Ltee., 6 B.L.R.
65, 85-91 (Que. S.C. 1979).
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imposing any rigid limitations on the availability of the remedy in other
corporations. Thus, as with other procedural issues, the approach of
leaving the line drawing to the courts as opposed to imposing statutory
barriers has proved to be well advised.2
3.2. Oppressive and Unfairly Prejudicial Conduct
Another important issue which Canadian legislators left in the
hands of the courts was determining what constitutes oppression, unfair
prejudice, or conduct which unfairly disregards the interests of the ap-
plicant.53 The courts have taken a narrow view of what constitutes op-
pression. Generally, as has occurred in some U.S. cases dealing with
applications for dissolution or other relief on the basis of oppressive
conduct, Canadian courts have followed the jurisprudence developed
under the original English provision. Thus, oppression has been char-
acterized as conduct which is burdensome, harsh and wrongful, or
which lacks of probity and fair dealing. 4
While the Canadian judiciary has taken a narrow view of oppres-
sion, this has not been the case with unfairly prejudicial conduct."' It
/.
52. But see F. BUCKLEY & M. CONNELLY, CORPORATIONS - CASES, TExTs
AND MATERIALS 611-12, 677-78 (1984) (suggesting that the oppression remedy should
only apply to closely held corporations).
53. On the other hand, in applications involving closely held corporations, the
Minnesota provision directs courts to consider reasonable expectations and the duties
owed by majority shareholders under U.S. case law in determining whether to grant
relief and what relief is appropriate. See Olson, supra note 1, at 646-58. An approach
similar to that of Minnesota is recommended in Phillips, supra note 1. Other U.S.
authors have argued that the specific conduct constituting oppression should be set out
in the relevant statute. See Davidian, supra note 1, at 57-62; Shapiro, Involuntary
Dissolution of Close Corporations for Mistreatment of Minority Shareholders, 60
WASH. U. L.Q. 1119, 1147, 1151-52 (1982).
54. Nystad v. Harcrest Apartments, 3 B.C.L.R.2d 40 (B.C.S.C. 1986); Journet
v. Superchef, 29 B.L.R. 206 (Que. S.C. 1984); Re Abraham and Inter Wide Invs. Ltd.,
20 D.L.R.4th 267 (Ont. H.C. 1986); O'Neill v. Dunsmuir Holdings (B.C.S.C.
1980)(unreported); O'Connor v. Winchester Oil & Gas Inc., 69 B.C.L.R. 330
(B.C.S.C. 1986); Redekop v. Robco Constr. Ltd., 89 D.L.R.3d 507 (B.C.S.C. 1978);
Jarman v. Brown, 13 B.C.L.R. 152 (B.C.S.C. 1979); Burnett v. Tsang, 61 A.R. 219
(Alta. Q.B. 1985). But see Michalak v. Biotech Elecs. Ltd., 35 B.L.R. 1 (Que S.C.
1987)(oppression is broader under § 241 of the C.B.C.A. than it was under the English
case law). U.S. cases which utilized the English concept of oppression include: Skierka
v. Skierka Bros., Inc., 629 P.2d 214 (Mont. 1981); Gimpel v. Bolestein, 125 Misc. 2d
45, 477 N.Y.S.2d 1014 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1984); Baker v. Commercial Body Builders, 264
Or. 614, 507 P.2d 387 (1973). See Hillman, supra note 25, at 45-49; Shapiro, supra
note 53, at 1135-36.
55. Little consideration has been given to what constitutes conduct which un-
fairly disregards the interests of the applicant. It has been recognized that this stands as
an independent basis for relief and may have a broader scope than unfairly prejudicial
conduct. In no case, however, has a specific finding of such conduct been found. See
Mason v. Intercity Properties, 37 B.L.R. 6, 10 (Ont. C.A. 1987); Bernard v. Mont-
gomery, 36 B.L.R. 257, 261 (Sask. Q.B. 1987); Miller v. F. Mendel Holdings Ltd.,
[Vol. 10:3
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol10/iss3/1
OPPRESSION REMEDY: CANADIAN LAW
has been held that unfair prejudice to the applicant connotes a wider
scope of conduct than oppression.56 Unlike oppression, the existence of
unfairly prejudicial conduct is determined by the effect on the share-
holder, as opposed to the motives or the nature of the conduct of the
majority.5" An applicant, however, will not be unfairly prejudiced sim-
ply because he or she is adversely affected by the operations of the
corporation.58 Instead, the conduct must be detrimental or damaging to
the applicant's rights in a manner which is unjust or inequitable.59
Canadian courts, however, have not attempted to develop a precise
definition or a comprehensive theoretical framework for unfairly preju-
dicial conduct. No attempt has been made, for example, to determine
whether relief should be granted on the basis of frustrated reasonable
expectations, as is occurring with increasing frequency under U.S. op-
pression/dissolution provisions." In the United States, the judiciary has
been criticized for failing to develop a more rigorous approach to such
provisions."' In Canada, however, the lack of a precise definition has
[1984] 2 W.W.R. 683, 695 (Sask. Q.B.).
56. Nystad v. Harcrest Apartments, 3 B.C.L.R.2d 40, 46 (B.C.S.C. 1986); Re
Sabex Internationale, 6 B.L.R. 65, 85-87 (Que. S.C. 1979); Journet v. Superchef, 29
B.L.R. 206, 223 (Que. S.C. 1984); Bosman v. Doric Holdings, 6 B.C.L.R. 189, 191
(B.C.S.C. 1978); Re Peterson and Kanata Invs. Ltd., 60 D.L.R.3d 527, 543 (B.C.S.C.
1975); Re Abraham and Inter Wide Invs. Ltd., 20 D.L.R.4th 267, 276 (Ont. H.C.
1986); Diligenti v. RWMD Operations, 1 B.C.L.R. 36, 42-44 (B.C.S.C. 1976); Miller
v. F. Mendel Holdings Ltd., [1984] 2 W.W.R. 683, 697 (Sask. Q.B.).
57. Sparling v. Javelin Int'l Ltd., [1986] R.J.Q. 1073, 1077 (Que. S.C.); Nystad
v. Harcrest Apartments, 3 B.C.L.R.2d 40, 47 (B.C.S.C. 1986); Low v. Ascot Jockey
Club Ltd., 1 B.C.L.R.2d 123, 128-29 (B.C.S.C. 1986). Dicta in Brant Invs. v. Keeprite
Inc., 37 B.L.R. 65, 99-100, 107-10 (Ont. H.C. 1987), suggest that improper motive
may be required even with unfairly prejudicial conduct. Re Ferguson and Imax Sys-
tems Corp., 43 O.R.2d 128, 137 (Ont. C.A. 1983), states that bona fides is relevant to a
finding of unfairly prejudicial conduct; absence of bona fides, however, is not necessary
for conduct to be unfairly prejudicial.
58. See Chrysler Canada Ltd. v. Richmond Plymouth (B.C.S.C. 1988)(unre-
ported); Re Goldstream Resources Ltd., 2 B.C.L.R.2d 244 (B.C.S.C. 1986); O'Connor
v. Winchester Oil & Gas Inc., 69 B.C.L.R. 330 (B.C.S.C. 1986).
59. Johnston v. West Fraser Timber Co., 17 B.L.R. 16, 71 (B.C.S.C. 1982);
Diligenti v. RWMD Operations, 1 B.C.L.R. 36, 45-46 (B.C.S.C. 1976); O'Connor v.
Winchester Oil & Gas Inc., 69 B.C.L.R. 330, 337 (B.C.S.C. 1986).
60. There have been suggestions that Canadian courts are in fact using the op-
pression remedy to protect the thwarted expectations of shareholders. See, e.g., WEL-
LING, supra note 4, at 533-37; Anisman, supra note 10, at 482-83. However, the
courts have not expressly recognized that this is what is occurring.
On the reasonable expectations analysis in the United States, see sources cited
supra note 25. See also Meiselman v. Meiselman, 307 S.E.2d 551 (1983); Topper v.
Park Sheraton Pharmacy Inc., 433 N.Y.S.2d 359 (1980); Exadaktilos v. Cinnaminson
Realty Co., 400 A.2d 554 (1979); Capital Toyota Inc. v. Gervin, 381 So.2d 1038
(1980); O'Donnel v. Marine Repair Services, 530 F. Supp. 1199 (1982); In re Kemp
& Beatley, Inc., 484 N.Y.S.2d 799 (1984); Gunzberg v. Art-Lloyd Metal Products
Corp., 492 N.Y.S.2d 83 (1985); In re Imperatore, 512 N.Y.S.2d 904 (1987).
61. Davidian, supra note 1, at 57-62; Chittur, supra note 45, at 139-43, 170-71;
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not generated a significant degree of controversy. This may be because
the oppression provision is still new enough that the courts and aca-
demic commentators are prepared to accept a case by case approach.
Further, the use of a theoretical framework would not necessarily be a
panacea. The limited U.S. experience with the reasonable expectations
analysis indicates that it may not be amenable to all situations which
can arise under a dissolution/oppression provision and that it does not
guarantee a broad interpretation of such provisions.62 At any rate, the
absence of a precise definition or theoretical framework has not pre-
vented the courts from utilizing the oppression remedy to intervene in a
wide variety of circumstances. The most important classes of cases
where the remedy has been utilized are worth consideration.
It is difficult to classify the cases which have arisen under the op-
pression remedy in a perfectly satisfactory fashion. Any division will be
arbitrary to a certain extent, as the factual circumstances in each of the
cases have been different. Also, some cases fit comfortably into two or
more classes.6" Further, the courts themselves have generally refrained
from classifying the cases. Despite these qualifications, clearly the most
common type of oppression application alleges that the controllers of
the corporation have diverted corporate profits to their own use, or have
used corporate money or assets for their personal advantage. When
such conduct is proved the courts have invariably granted the applica-
tion and provided relief.6" This is not startling. The conduct involved in
the cases likely constituted breaches of fiduciary duty and, even before
Shapiro, supra note 53, at 1132-43, 1147, 1151-52.
In McCauley v. McCauley & Son Inc., 724 P.2d 232 (1986), however, Justice
Garcia defended the lack of a rigidly defined standard for oppression, arguing that this
gave the courts freedom to determine whether the acts involved frustrated reasonable
expectations or otherwise merited relief. Id. at 236.
62. See Exadaktilos v. Cinnaminson Realty Co., 400 A.2d 554 (1979); Gimpel v.
Bolestein, 477 N.Y.S.2d 1014 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1984); Capital Toyota Inc. v. Gervin, 381
So.2d 1038 (1980); Shapiro, supra note 53, at 1142-43, 1152.
63. This should not be surprising, as those who control corporations often use a
variety of techniques to freeze-out or otherwise mistreat minority shareholders. See
O'NEAL & THOMPSON, supra note 3, at ch. 3.
64. Sparling v. Javelin Int'l Ltd., [19861 R.J.Q. 1073 (Que. S.C.); Journet v.
Superchef, 29 B.L.R. 206 (Que. S.C. 1984); Re Peterson and Kanata Invs. Ltd., 60
D.L.R.3d 527 (B.C.S.C. 1975); Re Abraham and Inter Wide Invs. Ltd., 20 D.L.R.4th
267 (Ont. H.C. 1986); Miller v. F. Mendel Holdings Ltd., [1984] 2 W.W.R. 683
(Sask. Q.B.); Inversiones Montforte S.A. v. Javelin Int'l Ltd., 17 B.L.R. 230 (Que.
S.C. 1982); Redekop v. Robco Constr. Ltd., 89 D.L.R.3d 507 (B.C.S.C. 1978); Jack-
man v. Jackets Enters. Ltd., 4 B.C.L.R. 358 (B.C.S.C. 1977); Re Romana Inn Ltd., 48
B.C.L.R. 65 (B.C.S.C. 1983). Allegations of misuse of corporate property were not
proved in Brant Invs. Ltd. v. Keeprite Inc., 37 B.L.R. 65 (Ont. H.C. 1987) and John-
ston v. West Fraser Timber Co., 133 D.L.R.3d 77 (B.C.C.A. 1982). This vas also the
case in Jarman v. Brown, 13 B.C.L.R. 152 (B.C.S.C. 1979), though a remedy was
granted on other grounds.
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the statutory reforms, may well have been grounds for a successful per-
sonal action or winding-up application.65
A significant number of oppression applications allege that the
corporate affairs and proceedings have not been conducted in accor-
dance with relevant legislation or the corporate constitution. Not sur-
prisingly, when the procedures utilized are found proper, the applica-
tion has been dismissed.66 Unlike with cases involving misuse of
corporate assets, however, mere proof of non-compliance with legisla-
tion or the corporate constitution has generally not been sufficient to
support a successful application. Instead, something more than irregu-
lar corporate procedure is required, such as a plan by the controllers of
the corporation to operate the corporation without regard for other
shareholders.6 7 Similarly, the fact that proper corporate procedures are
followed will not prevent a successful oppression application.68
This is illustrated by cases involving removal of a director, officer,
or employee of the corporation. Unlike improper use of corporate as-
sets, such conduct was generally unassailable before the enactment of
the oppression remedy, as removal from the board of directors and from
managerial and employment positions is clearly permitted under Cana-
dian corporation legislation. 9 Nevertheless, a significant number of
successful applications have been made under the oppression remedy in
situations where the applicant was excluded from employment, partici-
pation in management, and remuneration.
Exclusion from the day-to-day operation of the corporation, as
such, will not automatically entitle an applicant to relief under the op-
pression remedy. The courts have not lost sight of the fact that removal
of directors and officers by the corporation is permitted under general
65. See HADDEN, supra note 4, at 262, 264-65; Waldron, supra note 16, at 138-
42; Schaef, supra note 24, at 519-20. See also sources cited supra note 10.
66. Brant Invs. v. Keeprite Inc., 37 B.L.R. 65, 104-06, 110-11 (Ont. H.C.
1987); Jacobsen v. United Canso Oil & Gas Ltd., 73 A.P.R. 692 (N.S.S.C 1979);
Turner v. North Shore Taxi Ltd., 26 B.C.L.R. 367 (B.C.S.C. 1981).
67. Journet v. Superchef, 29 B.L.R. 206 (Que. S.C. 1984); Redekop v. Robco
Constr. Ltd., 89 D.L.R.3d 507 (B.C.S.C. 1978); Re Romana Inn, 48 B.C.L.R. 65
(B.C.S.C. 1983); Jackman v. Jackets Enters., 4 B.C.L.R. 358 (B.C.S.C. 1977). In
Jackman, there was some suggestion that the failure to comply with proper corporate
procedures might give rise to some relief absent the other improper conduct.
68. This was expressly recognized in MacMillan v. Progressive Mill Supplies
Ltd., 6 B.C.L.R.2d 135 (B.C.C.A. 1986).
69. See Beck, supra note 10, at 556-57. The only remedy that a minority share-
holder could realistically have utilized was an application for winding-up on the theory
that the corporation was in fact an incorporated partnership. There were cases in
which winding-up was ordered because of exclusion from corporate affairs if it was
understood that the applicant was to be an active rather than silent partner. See Huber-
man, supra note 12, at 309-10.
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corporate legislation. 0 Also, the courts, not surprisingly, have con-
cluded that the applicant has no complaint if the applicant left his or
her position voluntarily.71 Further, it appears that removal will not be
unfairly prejudicial if those operating the company have justifiably lost
faith in the applicant.7 2 It also appears that if the parties have ex-
pressly dealt with the possibility of termination in a shareholders'
agreement, the likelihood that removal from employment with the cor-
poration will constitute unfairly prejudicial conduct will be reduced. 3
Beyond this, dismissal of the applicant without sufficient notice under
the common law of employment contracts does not necessarily amount
to unfair prejudice. 4
Clearly, then, something more than mere removal from a particu-
lar post with the corporation or a reduction in the applicant's role with
the corporation is required for an application under the oppression
remedy to succeed. If the removal of the applicant or the reduction in
the applicant's role is part of a plan ultimately to force the applicant to
leave the corporation, the prospects of a successful application will in-
crease significantly."5 This will also be the case if the removal is part of
a plan by those controlling the corporation to operate the corporation
without regard for any of the other shareholders." Finally, an applica-
tion is more likely to succeed if the relationship between the partici-
pants was such that the applicant was vested with some form of equita-
ble right to participate in the management of the corporation.""
There have been a number of cases where an oppression applica-
70. Diligenti v. RWMD Operations, 1 B.C.L.R. 36, 46, 51 (B.C.S.C. 1976);
Miller v. F. Mendel Holdings Ltd., [1984] 2 W.W.R. 683, 696 (Sask. Q.B.); Burnett
v. Tsang, 61 A.R. 219, 224 (Alta. Q.B. 1985).
71. H.J. Rai Ltd. v. Reed Point Marina (B.C.S.C. 1981) (unreported);
Eiserman v. Ara Farms Ltd., 44 Sask. R. 61 (Sask. Q.B. 1985); Johnston v. West
Fraser Timber Co., 17 B.L.R. 16 (B.C.S.C. 1981), rev'd, 133 D.L.R.3d 77 (B.C.C.A.
0982) (at trial).
72. Chrysler Canada Ltd. v. Richmond Plymouth (B.C.S.C. 1988)(unreported).
73. Burnett v. Tsang, 61 A.R. 219 (Alta. Q.B. 1985).
74. Chrysler Canada Ltd. v. Richmond Plymouth (B.C.S.C. 1988) (unreported).
75. Re Ferguson and Imax Systems Corp., 43 O.R.2d 128 (Ont. C.A. 1983);
O'Neill v. Dunsmuir Holdings (B.C.S.C. 1980)(unreported).
76. Mason v. Intercity Properties, 37 B.L.R. 6, 8-10, 25-26 (Ont. C.A. 1987);
Re Little Billy's Restaurant, 45 B.C.L.R. 388 (B.C.S.C. 1983); Miller v. F. Mendel
Holdings Ltd., [1984] 2 W.W.R. 683 (Sask. Q.B.); Redekop v. Robco Constr. Ltd., 89
D.L.R.3d 507 (B.C.S.C. 1978); Re Romana Inn Ltd., 48 B.C.L.R. 65 (B.C.S.C. 1983).
In Mason, Little Billy's, Re Romana Inn, and Reeder v. Jones (B.C.S.C. 1978)(unre-
ported), the applicant was not formally dxcluded from a particular post, but his in-
volvement in the corporation was significantly reduced and his access to the income of
the corporation was virtually cut-off.
77. Re Ferguson and Imax Systems Corp., 43 O.R.2d 128 (Ont. C.A. 1983);
Diligenti v. RWMD Operations, 1 B.C.L.R. 36 (B.C.S.C. 1976); O'Neill v. Dunsmuir
Holdings (B.C.S.C.1980)(unreported); Reeder v. Jones(B.C.S.C.1978)(unreported).
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tion was brought on the basis of conduct which was permissible under
the relevant legislation and the corporate constitution, but which alleg-
edly constituted a breach of underlying understandings and equitable
rights. These cases have most often involved exclusion from corporate
affairs, but they merit some independent consideration. The first case of
this type was Diligenti.78 As mentioned, this case was innovative in
terms of introducing the concept of equitable rights and obligations of
shareholders in order to overcome the capacity problem in the B.C. op-
pression provision. The case left some unanswered questions, however.
For example, could such equitable rights and obligations arise in corpo-
rations other than those of the type in Diligenti? In Diligenti, the par-
ticipants had been in partnership before incorporation and the relation-
ship between the participants was personal as well as commercial. In a
subsequent case where the conduct involved was clearly permissible
under the relevant legislation, but relief was granted on the basis of
breach of the equitable rights of the applicant, the court stressed that
the corporation was of the same type as that in Diligenti.7 9 Other cases
have not been as restrictive, however. The Ontario Court of Appeal has
expressly stated that equitable obligations and considerations are rele-
vant in cases involving closely held corporations, thus embracing a
wider class of corporations than those of the type in Diligenti.8 ° Fur-
ther, there have been statements in cases involving corporations which
do not fall within the Diligenti facts that equitable rights can form the
basis of a successful oppression application."' Finally, a finding that a
corporation is not of the type in Diligenti will not preclude a successful
application under the oppression remedy."2 Consequently, while it is
more likely that equitable rights meriting protection under the oppres-
sion remedy will be found in corporations with the same characteristics
as those in Diligenti, such equitable rights and obligations can clearly
arise in other corporations.8"
78. 1 B.C.L.R. 36 (B.C.S.C. 1976). See also HADDEN, supra note 4, at 262-63;
Waldron, supra note 16, at 142-45; Schaef, supra note 24, at 516-18.
79. Re Sabex Internationales, 6 B.L.R. 65 (Que. S.C. 1979).
80. Re Ferguson and Imax Systems Corp., 43 O.R.2d 128 (Ont. C.A. 1983).
While many definitions of a closely held corporation include an overlap between own-
ership and management, a pre-existing partnership or a personal relationship is not
generally a prerequisite for a corporation to be considered closely held.
81. Mason v. Intercity Properties, 37 B.L.R. 6, 23-25 (Ont. C.A. 1987); John-
ston v. West Fraser Timber Co., 17 B.L.R. 16, 68-72 (B.C.S.C. 1981), rev'd, 133
D.L.R.3d 77 (B.C.C.A. 1982) (at trial); O'Connor v. Winchester Oil & Gas Inc., 69
B.C.L.R. 330, 337 (B.C.S.C. 1986).
82. Jackman v. Jackets Enters. Ltd., 4 B.C.L.R. 358 (B.C.S.C. 1977).
83. For example, in Re Goldstream Resources Ltd., 2 B.C.L.R.2d 244 (B.C.S.C.
1986), Justice Spencer stated that the widely held nature of the corporation and purely
commercial relationship between the participants precluded the existence of any equita-
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Another issue brought up by Diligenti is whether any form of un-
derstanding or agreement between the parties is necessary for equitable
rights and obligations to exist outside the framework of the relevant
legislation and corporate constitution. In Diligenti there was an agree-
ment or understanding about the expectations of the participants.84
Subsequent cases indicate, however, that no such finding is necessary
for relief on the basis of equitable rights under the oppression rem-
edy.8 5 Indeed, relief has been granted in cases where the conduct was in
accordance with the express agreement of the parties.86 It should be
noted, also, that mere breach of an agreement between shareholders
will not found a successful application. In one case, the application was
denied in part because the agreement between shareholders was private
and thus did not involve corporate affairs.8s This line of reasoning sug-
gests share transfers between shareholders cannot constitute oppressive
conduct. The reasoning, however, has not been used in subsequent
cases.
8s
Cases involving misuse of corporate assets, the irregular conduct of
corporate affairs, and exclusion from involvement with the corporation
have been common under U.S. dissolution/oppression provisions.8 9
ble right of the majority shareholders to retain their majority. The English position
appears to be similar to the Canadian. See Hannigan, supra note 22, at 60-64.
84. Similarly, agreements between the participants were found in O'Neill v.
Dunsmuir Holdings (B.C.S.C. 1980) (unreported) and in Reeder v. Jones (B.C.S.C.
1978) (unreported).
It appears that some form of agreement or understanding, either explicit or im-
plicit, is necessary for relief under the United States reasonable expectations analysis.
See Meiselman v. Meiselman, 307 S.E.2d 551, 563 (1983); Olson, supra note 1, at
655-56; Capel, supra note 40, at 1016-17; Hillman, supra note 25, at 77-78.
85. There was no such finding, for example, in Re Ferguson and Imax Systems
Corp., 43 O.R.2d 128 (Ont. C.A. 1983) or Re Little Billy's Restaurant, 45 B.C.L.R.
388 (B.C.S.C. 1983).
86. Re Bury, 12 D.L.R.4th 451 (Ont. H.C. 1985). See also Low v. Ascot Jockey
Club Ltd., I B.C.L.R.2d 123 (B.C.S.C. 1986).
87. Johnston v. West Fraser Timber Co., 17 B.L.R. 16 (B.C.S.C. 1981), rev'd,
133 D.L.R.3d 77 (B.C.C.A. 1982) (on appeal).
88. In MacMillan v. Progressive Mill Supplies Ltd., 6 B.C.L.R.2d 135
(B.C.C.A. 1986), the share transfer issue was raised, but the court refused to consider
it. In Michalak v. Biotech Elecs., 35 B.L.R. 1 (Que. S.C. 1987), the substance of the
application was a sale of shares to the president of the corporation. No mention was
made of the private agreement problem. Even if share transactions are not covered,
shareholders may still have a remedy. Liability might arise at common law. See, e.g.,
Dusik v. Newton, 62 B.C.L.R. 1 (B.C.C.A. 1985). Also, jurisdictions with the oppres-
sion remedy have provisions imposing civil liability for insider trading. Furthermore,
provincial securities legislation, which applies to corporations with publicly traded
shares, imposes civil liability for insider trading. On the United States position, see
O'NEAL & THOMPSON, supra note 3, at para. 3.10.
89. On misapplication of assets, see, for example, Gimpel v. Bolestein, 477
N.Y.S.2d 1014 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1984); Baker v. Commercial Body Builders, 507 P.2d
387 (1973); McCauley v. McCauley & Son Inc., 724 P.2d 232 (1986); Coduti v.
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Less common, however, have been complaints based on alteration of
rights attached to shares or unequal treatment as between sharehold-
ers.9" This is probably because cases involving such conduct are
brought on the basis of breach of duties owed to minority sharehold-
ers.91 Such cases, however, have formed the basis of a significant num-
ber of applications under the oppression remedy in Canada. This class
of cases can be divided into three groups. One is where the controllers
of the corporation are seeking, by way of corporate reorganization, to
place themselves in a position where they can buy out certain minority
shareholders who want to retain their shares.92 The second is where
share issuances alter the proportional shareholdings in the corpora-
tion.9" The third is where certain shareholders are given the opportu-
Hellwig, 469 N.E.2d 220 (1984); Sauer v. Moffitt, 363 N.W.2d 269 (1984); Sax v.
World Wide Press Inc., 809 F.2d 610 (1987). Recent cases in which exclusion from
employment and management was alleged include Gimpel, Baker, and McCauley. See
also Meiselman v. Meiselman, 307 S.E.2d 551 (1983); Exadaktilos v. Cinnaminson
Realty Co., 400 A.2d 554 (1979); Topper v. Park Sheraton Pharmacy Inc., 433
N.Y.S.2d 359 (1980); Capital Toyota Inc. v. Gervin, 381 So.2d 1038 (1980); In re
Kemp & Beatley Inc., 484 N.Y.S.2d 799 (1984); In re Imperatore, 512 N.Y.S.2d 904
(1987); Gunzberg v. Art-Lloyd Metal Prods. Corp., 492 N.Y.S.2d 83 (1985);
O'Donnel v. Marine Repair Servs., 530 F. Supp. 1199 (1982); Notzke v. Art Gallery
Inc., 405 N.E.2d 839 (1980). On the affairs of the corporation being conducted in an
irregular fashion, see Gimpel; McCauley; Coduti; Sauer; Stefano v. Coppock, 705 P.2d
443 (1985).
90. For examples in which such conduct was the basis of the application, see
Sundberg v. Lampert Lumber Co., 390 N.W.2d 352 (1986); Browning v. C & C Ply-
wood Corp., 434 P.2d 339 (1967).
91. See, e.g., Ski Roundtop Inc. v. Hall, 658 P.2d 1071 (1983) (allegations that
defendant obtained control through the issuance of shares on unequal terms formed
basis of breach of duty to the minority, while the defendant's conduct once control was
obtained formed basis of dissolution/oppression application). Duties owed to minority
shareholders will be examined in greater detail infra.
92. Alexander v. Westeel-Rosco Ltd., 93 D.L.R.3d 116 (Ont. H.C. 1978); Rus-
kin v. Canada All-News Radio Ltd., 7 B.L.R. 142 (Ont. H.C. 1979); Burdon v.
Zeller's Ltd., 16 B.L.R. 59 (Que. S.C. 1981). Note that these cases involved prelimi-
nary injunctions and thus did not constitute a full hearing of the issues. In these cases a
merger of corporation "A" with corporation "B," which was owned solely by the ma-
jority of "A" shareholders, was used to oust the minority of "A" shareholders. Such a
pattern is most likely to emerge in Canada when the "A" majority cannot utilize the
statutory take-over procedure which exists in most Canadian jurisdictions. Under this
procedure when a take-over bid is accepted by 90% or more of the shareholders, the
remaining shareholders can be required to sell their shares at fair value. See, e.g.,
C.B.C.A., supra note 6, at § 206. See generally Schaef, supra note 24, at 514-16; Beck,
supra note 2, at 321-25; HADDEN, supra note 4, at 595-615; Waldron, supra note 16,
at 146-48; Halperin, Statutory Elimination of Minority Shareholders in Canada in
Sarna 1, supra note 16, at 1; Kroft, Further Reflections on 'Going Private' - Towards
a Rational Scheme of Regulating Minority Squeeze-Out Transactions, 13 OTTAWA L.
REV. 356 (1981). The complex United States law relating to mergers and squeeze-outs
is discussed in O'NEAL & THOMPSON, supra note 3, at paras. 5.04-5.05.
93. Re Sabex Internationale, 6 B.L.R. 65 (Que. S.C. 1979); H.J. Rai Ltd. v.
Reed Point Marina (B.C.S.C. 1981) (unreported); Re Peterson and Kanata Invs. Ltd.,
60 D.L.R.3d 527 (B.C.S.C. 1975); Re Goldstream Resources Ltd., 2 B.C.L.R.2d 244
19881
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
U. Pa. J. Int'l Bus. L.
nity to have their shares bought out, and other shareholders are not, or
are offered a lower price.94
In all three situations, successful applications have been made
under the oppression remedy. 5 This does not mean, however, that be-
cause of the introduction of the oppression remedy that all shareholders
are entitled to remain shareholders, that all shareholders have the right
to retain their proportional shareholdings, or that all shareholders must
have the opportunity to leave the corporation on equal terms.96 Fur-
ther, though it is difficult to generalize, the cases indicate that the
courts will not interfere with unequal treatment of shareholders if a
persuasive business reason can be given for the unequal treatment.9 7 A
persuasive business reason, however, will not likely be sufficient to pre-
clude a successful application if there was an underlying understanding
between the participants that there would be equality of treatment, or
if the impact on the applicant is particularly harsh.98
In summary, despite the lack of specific guidance from legislators,
the courts have done a good job of determining what conduct will found
a successful application under the oppression remedy. Applications
(B.C.S.C. 1986). Under the C.B.C.A. and the statutes modeled after it, a corporation is
authorized to require shares be issued on a pro rata basis. See, e.g., C.B.C.A., supra
note 6, at § 28. Under the B.C.C.A., non-reporting corporations, that is corporations
without publicly traded shares, are required to issue new shares on a pro rata basis. See
B.C.C.A., supra note 6, at § 41. On the United States position regarding share issu-
ances, see O'NEAL & THOMPSON, supra note 3, at para. 3.20.
94. Re Giroday Sawmills Ltd., 49 B.C.L.R. 378 (B.C.S.C. 1983); O'Connor v.
Winchester Oil & Gas Inc., 69 B.C.L.R. 330 (B.C.S.C. 1986); MacMillan v. Progres-
sive Mill Supplies Ltd., 6 B.C.L.R.2d 135 (B.C.C.A. 1986). See also Mason v.
M.O.W. Holdings Ltd., 23 B.L.R. 255 (Man. Q.B. 1983) (the controllers altered the
corporate constitution so as to set at a low level the price at which the applicant was to
sell his shares under the corporation's buy-sell procedures).
95. Alexander v. Westeel-Rosco Ltd., 93 D.L.R.3d 116 (Ont. H.C. 1978); Rus-
kin v. Canada All-News Radio Ltd., 7 B.L.R. 142 (Ont. H.C. 1979); Burdon v.
Zeller's Ltd., 16 B.L.R. 59 (Que. S.C. 1981); Re Sabex Internationale, 6 B.L.R. 65
(Que. S.C. 1979); Re Peterson and Kanata Invs. Ltd., 60 D.L.R.3d 527 (B.C.S.C.
1975); MacMillan v. Progressive Mill Supplies Ltd., 6 B.C.L.R.2d 135 (B.C.C.A.
1986).
96. Re Goldstream Resources Ltd., 2 B.C.L.R.2d 244, 246-47 (B.C.S.C. 1986).
97. See H.J. Rai Ltd. v. Reed Point Marina (B.C.S.C. 1981) (unreported); Re
Giroday Sawmills Ltd., 49 B.C.L.R. 378 (B.C.S.C. 1983); O'Connor v. Winchester Oil
& Gas Inc., 69 B.C.L.R. 330 (B.C.S.C. 1986). United States commentators and courts
have recognized the relevance of business justifications for unequal treatment. See, e.g.,
Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home Ltd., 370 Mass. 842, 353 N.E.2d 657 (1976);
Hallahan v. Haltom Corp., 7 Mass. App. Ct. 68, 385 N.E.2d 1033 (1979); Olson,
supra note 1, at 652-53; O'NEAL & THOMPSON, supra note 3, at paras. 5.04, 5.10,
7.17; Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 45, at 293-96; Hochstetler & Svejda, supra
note 46, at 925-30.
98. See Re Sabex Internationale, 6 B.L.R. 65 (Que. S.C. 1979) (underlying un-
derstanding); Nystad v. Harcrest Apartments, 3 B.C.L.R.2d 40 (B.C.S.C. 1986) (harsh
consequences).
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have been successful in a fairly wide range of circumstances, and the
courts have shown little inclination to limit the oppression remedy to
the classes of cases where successful applications have already been
made. Conversely, however, the courts have imposed sensible limits on
the type of conduct which will give rise to a successful application.
Thus, breaches of relevant legislation, removal from a position with the
corporation, and unequal treatment as between shareholders will not be
sufficient, without more, to found a successful application.
3.3. Remedies
As mentioned, when a successful oppression application has been
brought, it is expressly provided that the court has the discretion to
grant a wide variety of orders. Past history suggested that the courts
would be reluctant to innovate with respect to remedies. Before statu-
tory reform, as with many U.S. dissolution/oppression provisions, there
was no specific authorization for courts to grant alternative remedies on
winding-up applications. Canadian judges, unlike their U.S. counter-
parts, most often held that there consequently was no jurisdiction to
grant alternative remedies on winding-up applications. 9 Now that Ca-
nadian judges have been given explicit statutory authorization to grant
a wide variety of remedies, however, there has been no hesitation to use
these powers.
The order which is most often sought and which is most com-
monly granted in a successful application is a buyout of the applicant's
shares by the corporation or other shareholders. Still, the courts have
not always granted such an order when requested. Most often, a
buyout is not ordered when the judge is of the view that management of
the company is competent and other remedies will be sufficient to rem-
edy the detrimental conduct.1 °
In relation to successful applications where a buyout is ordered,
determination of the price of the shares is often a more contentious
issue than the determination of whether a buyout is the appropriate
remedy.' 0 ' There is no statutory direction as to how shares are to be
99. See supra note 12. On the U.S. position, see H. HAYNSWORTH, ORGANIZ-
ING A SMALL BUSINESS ENTrrY 297 (1986) (especially n. 263); Gimpel v. Bolestein,
477 N.Y.S.2d 1014 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1984); Baker v. Commercial Body Builders, 507
P.2d 387 (1973); McCauley v. McCauley & Son Inc., 724 P.2d 232 (1986).
100. Re Sabex Internationale, 6 B.L.R. 65 (Que. S.C. 1979); Jarman v. Brown,
13 B.C.L.R. 152 (B.C.S.C. 1979); Low v. Ascot Jockey Club Ltd., 1 B.C.L.R.2d 123
(B.C.S.C. 1986); Jackman v. Jackets Enters. Ltd., 4 B.C.L.R. 358 (B.C.S.C. 1977).
101. Quite frequently in the reported cases, the court has left the determination
of the value of the shares to the parties or has stipulated that the matter should be dealt
with at a later date. See Nystad v. Harcrest Apartments, 3 B.C.L.R.2d 40 (B.C.S.C.
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valued. The courts, however, have generally held that the applicant is
entitled to the fair value of the shares, which is the standard used under
the appraisal remedy."02 In the oppression remedy cases where the
courts have had to determine fair value, market price has been irrele-
vant, as the shares in all of the cases were not being traded on any
stock exchange. The courts have instead determined fair value by first
fixing the value of the business and then by attaching a price to the
applicant's share of the business.103 Courts have generally valued the
business by determining what a prudent investor, knowledgeable of the
business, under no compulsion to buy, would be willing to pay a ven-
dor, under no compulsion to sell, for the business as a going concern.
104
In terms of attaching a value to the applicant's share of the busi-
ness, the primary issue has been whether the applicant is entitled to a
pro rata share of the value of the business based on the percentage of
shares held, or whether a minority discount should be applied. 0 5 As in
the United States, the Canadian case law on this issue is mixed. 06 The
trend of authority, however, is that no minority discount should be ap-
plied. The courts apply a minority discount only if the applicant's con-
duct was of such a grave character that the applicant deserved to be
excluded from the corporation.
10 7
1986); Journet v. Superchef, 29 B.L.R. 206 (Que. S.C. 1984); Diligenti v. RWMD
Operations, 1 B.C.L.R. 36 (B.C.S.C. 1976); Redekop v. Robco Constr. Ltd., 89
D.L.R.3d 507 (B.C.S.C. 1978); Mason v. M.O.W. Holdings Ltd., 23 B.L.R. 255
(Man. Q.B., 1983). In Diligenti, the subsequent determination itself became a reported
case. Diligenti v. RWMD Operations Kelowna Ltd. (No. 2), 4 B.C.L.R. 134
(B.C.S.C. 1977).
102. Mason v. Intercity Properties, 37 B.L.R. 6 (Ont. C.A. 1987); Re Abraham
and Inter Wide Invs. Ltd., 20 D.L.R.4th 267 (Ont. H.C. 1986); Johnston v. West
Fraser Timber Co., 17 B.L.R. 16 (B.C.S.C. 1981), rev'd, 133 D.L.R.3d 77 (B.C.C.A.
1982)(at trial); Miller v. F. Mendel Holdings Ltd., [1984] 2 W.W.R. 683 (Sask. Q.B.);
Diligenti v. RWMD Operations Kelowna Ltd. (No. 2), 4 B.C.L.R. 134 (B.C.S.C.
1977). In some cases, the value of the shares has been determined on the basis of the
circumstances of the case without any overt consideration of the standard to be applied.
See Re Bury, 12 D.L.R.4th 451 (Ont. H.C. 1985); Re Romana Inn Ltd., 48 B.C.L.R.
65 (B.C.S.C. 1983); MacMillan v. Progressive Mill Supplies Ltd., 6 B.C.L.R.2d 135
(B.C.C.A. 1986).
103. Re Abraham and Inter Wide Invs. Ltd., 20 D.L.R.4th 267 (Ont. H.C.
1986); Johnston v. West Fraser Timber Co., 17 B.L.R. 16 (B.C.S.C. 1981), rev'd, 133
D.L.R.3d 77 (B.C.C.A. 1982) (at trial); Diligenti v. RWMD Operations Kelowna
Ltd. (No. 2), 4 B.C.L.R. 134 (B.C.S.C. 1977).
104. In Re Romana Inn Ltd., 48 B.G.L.R. 65 (B.C.S.C. 1983), the liquidation
value of the corporation was the focus because the corporation had ceased to do
business.
105. This, indeed, was the sole issue in Mason v. Intercity Properties, 37 B.L.R.
6 (Ont. C.A. 1987), and Kummen v. Kummen-Shipman Ltd., [1983] 2 W.W.R. 577
(Man. C.A.).
106. On the U.S. law, see O'NEAL & THOMPSON, supra note 3, at para. 7.21
n.25.
107. The leading case on these issues is Mason v. Intercity Properties, 37 B.L.R.
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This approach to the minority discount issue is sensible."0 8 When
minority interests in corporations, closely held or otherwise, are sold
between parties at arms length there will usually be a minority dis-
count. Therefore, it makes a certain degree of sense to apply a minority
discount vhen a shareholder engages in conduct justifying expulsion -
the shareholder can be said to be notionally electing to leave the corpo-
ration in much the same way as when a shareholder relies on appraisal
rights. Where, however, the shareholder is leaving the corporation by
virtue of unfairly prejudicial conduct, it is less appropriate to treat the
applicant as electing to sell his or her shares. Instead, the shareholder
will have been forced out of the corporation, and requiring those re-
sponsible for the unfairly prejudicial conduct to pay more than the
shares would fetch on the market seems appropriate compensation.
While a buyout of the applicant is the most common remedy
granted, other remedies have been granted in a significant number of
oppression cases. Remedies other than buyout are divisable into two
basic types.1 09 The first is remedies which assist the applicant but do
not alter the basic structure of the corporation or the relationship be-
tween the participants. For example, in some cases, there have been
orders setting aside or preventing the corporation from acting on reso-
lutions of the shareholders or the directors." 0 In others, the court has
set aside transactions involving the corporation and those controlling
it."' Also, there have been orders requiring compliance with provisions
in the relevant corporation statute and requiring that the applicant be
provided with certain information concerning the corporation." 2 In one
6 (Ont. C.A. 1987), which followed Diligenti v. RWMD Operations Kelowna Ltd.
(No. 2), 4 B.C.L.R. 134 (B.C.S.C. 1977), Re Abraham and Inter Wide Invs. Ltd., 20
D.L.R.4th 267 (Ont. H.C. 1986), and the leading English case, Re Bird Precision
Fellows Ltd., [1984] 3 All E.R. 444 (C.A.). The court, in Johnston v. West Fraser
Timber Co., 17 B.L.R. 16 (B.C.S.C. 1981), rev'd, 133 D.L.R.3d 77 (B.C.C.A. 1982)
(at trial), decided to apply a minority discount.
108. The following analysis is based on Krishna, Determining the 'Fair Value'
of Corporate Shares, 13 C.B.L.J. 132, 165-76 (1987-1988). See also Macintosh, supra
note 13, at 201, 283-91.
109. Cf. WELLING, supra note 4, at 529-32.
110. Re Sabex Internationale, 6 B.L.R. 65 (Que. S.C. 1979); Carrington Viyella
Ltd. v. Taran (Que. S.C. 1983) (unreported); Re Ferguson and Imax Systems Corp.,
43 O.R.2d 128 (Ont. C.A. 1983); Re Little Billy's Restaurant, 45 B.C.L.R. 388
(B.C.S.C. 1983); Alexander v. Westeel-Rosco Ltd., 93 D.L.R.3d 116 (Ont. H.C.
1978); Ruskin v. Canada All-News Radio Ltd., 7 B.L.R. 142 (Ont. H.C. 1979);
Burdon v. Zeller's Ltd., 16 B.L.R. 59 (Que. S.C. 1981).
111. Re Little Billy's Restaurant, 45 B.C.L.R. 388 (B.C.S.C. 1983); Low v. As-
cot Jockey Club Ltd., 1 B.C.L.R.2d 123 (B.C.S.C. 1986). A U.S. case in which a
similar order was made was Skierka v. Skierka Bros., 629 P.2d 214 (1981).
112. Jarman v. Brown, 13 B.C.L.R. 152 (B.C.S.C. 1979); Jackman v. Jackets
Enters. Ltd., 4 B.C.L.R. 358 (B.C.S.C. 1977). Cf. Burnett v. Tsang, 61 A.R. 219
(Alta. Q.B. 1985).
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case, it was even ordered that the controlling shareholder of the corpo-
ration give a personal guarantee on a loan taken by the corporation." 3
To the second class of order other than a buyout of the applicant
belong those which realign the power structure within the corporation
or change the ground rules under which the corporation operates. For
example, in one case the court ordered that the applicants were entitled
to buy out the majority shareholder." 4 In another case, the powers of
the board of directors were suspended and a receiver was appointed to
operate the affairs of the corporation."' In subsequent proceedings in-
volving the same corporation, the court appointed a new board of direc-
tors." 6 Dissolution has even been granted on an oppression application
in one case, but the courts appear to be reluctant to make such an
order. 
1
4. RELATIONSHIP OF THE OPPRESSION REMEDY WITH OTHER
REMEDIES
4.1. Canada
Given the absence of procedural barriers, the wide scope of con-
duct which is covered, and the broad range of remedies which are avail-
able under the oppression remedy, it should not be surprising that this
remedy has become the most important under Canadian corporation
legislation. Other statutory remedies, on the other hand, have either
declined in importance or have not achieved the importance that had
been initially expected. For example, applications for winding-up by
minority shareholders are much less frequent than in jurisdictions
where there is no oppression remedy."" Also, appraisal rights and the
113. Jackman v. Jackets Enters. Ltd., 4 B.C.L.R. 358 (B.C.S.C. 1977).
114. Re Peterson and Kanata Invs. Ltd., 60 D.L.R.3d 527 (B.C.S.C. 1975).
115. Inversiones Montforte S.A. v. Javelin Int'l Ltd., 17 B.L.R. 230 (Que. S.C.
1982). A receiver was also appointed in Journet v. Superchef, 29 B.L.R. 206 (Que.
S.C. 1984), to operate the affairs of the corporation until the applicant's shares could be
bought at a fair price. On the U.S. law relating to the appointment of a custodian on
the application of a minority shareholder, see O'NEAL & THOMPSON, supra note 3, at
para. 10.10.
116. Sparling v. Javelin Int'l Ltd., [1986] R.J.Q. 1073 (Que. S.C.).
117. Reeder v. Jones (B.C.S.C. 1978) (unreported). See also Sparling v. Javelin
Int'l Ltd., [1986] R.J.Q. 1073, 1133-35 (Que. S.C.) (request for dissolution denied).
118. For example, in the Ontario Reports between 1974 and 1982 there were
seven reported winding-up applications. From 1982, the year the oppression remedy
was introduced, to 1988 there were no reported winding-up applications. There were,
however, four applications under the oppression remedy. The statutory provisions au-
thorizing dissolution are: B.C.C.A., supra note 6, at §§ 295-96; C.B.C.A., supra note
6, at § 214; M.B.C.A., supra note 6, at § 207; S.B.C.A., supra note 6, at § 207;
N.B.C.A., supra note 6, at § 141; O.B.C.A. 1982, supra note 6, at § 206, A.B.C.A.,
supra note 6, at § 207.
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statutory derivative action have been utilized less than had been antici-
pated when they were introduced." 9
In part, the lack of reliance on these remedies is due to their in-
herent shortcomings. This is certainly the case with appraisal rights.
Short time limits and a compulsory procedure which is so complex that
it can only be relied upon with legal advice have the effect of preclud-
ing many shareholders from using those rights. 20
To a significant extent, however, it is the presence of the oppres-
sion remedy which has caused other remedies to recede into subsidiary
status. For example, in relation to winding-up, the oppression remedy
covers most of the conduct which provides grounds for a winding-up
order, and the courts are much more sympathetic to applications under
the oppression remedy than they have been towards winding-up appli-
cations. 2 ' Further, if the applicant's primary objective is in fact to get
the corporation dissolved, such an order can be made under an oppres-
sion application. Also, a successful application under the winding-up
provision will not ensure that a winding-up order is in fact granted, as
it is expressly provided that the courts have the power to make the
same orders under a winding-up application that can be made in an
oppression remedy application. 22 Consequently, it is not surprising
that dissolution applications have been abandoned for the most part in
favor of applications under the oppression remedy.' 3
Similarly, the advantages of the oppression remedy have considera-
bly lessened the importance of the statutory derivative action. The stat-
utory derivative action has revamped what was an extremely trouble-
some area of the law, and the courts have interpreted the relevant
119. HADDEN, supra note 4, at 265; MacIntosh, supra note 13, at 297-98.
120. See HADDEN, supra note 4, at 255-60; WELLING, supra note 4, at 545-55;
Macintosh, supra note 13, at 249-65.
121. In a number of cases, judges have favorably contrasted the oppression rem-
edy with the winding-up remedy. See, e.g., Rafuse v. Bishop, 59 A.P.R. 70 (N.S.S.C.
1979); Nieforth v. Nieforth, MacKenzie Ltd., 163 A.P.R. 10 (N.S.S.C. 1985); Mason
v. Intercity Properties, 37 B.L.R. 6 (Ont. C.A. 1987); Re Abraham and Inter Wide
Invs. Ltd., 20 D.L.R.4th 267 (Ont. H.C. 1986).
122. The ability of the court to make the same orders is set out expressly in the
C.B.C.A. and the statutes modeled after it. Under the B.C.C.A., the position is not so
clear, but it has been held that such orders can in fact be made in a winding-up appli-
cation. Oakley v. McDougall, 14 B.C.L.R.2d 128 (B.C.C.A. 1987).
123. In fact, in two cases where a successful oppression application was made,
winding-up applications based upon the same facts had been previously made under the
unreformed legislation and were dismissed or abandoned. Re Abraham and Inter Wide
Invs. Ltd., 20 D.L.R.4th 267 (Ont. H.C. 1986); Miller v. F. Mendel Holdings Ltd.,
[1984] 2 W.W.R. 683 (Sask. Q.B.). There still are some successful applications for
dissolution in jurisdictions with the oppression remedy. See, e.g., 91436 Canada, Inc. v.
Evalayne Sales Corp., 54 C.B.R. 87 (Que. S.C. 1985); Mammone v. Doralin Invs.
Ltd., 54 C.B.R. 171 (Ont. H.C. 1985).
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statutory provisions broadly.124 Nevertheless, there are a number of
good reasons why minority shareholders have relied on the oppression
remedy rather than the statutory derivative action. Facts giving rise to
wrongs to the corporation, such as breaches of fiduciary duties owed by
directors, can often be the subject matter of an oppression application
as well as a statutory derivative action.125 An applicant seeking to bring
a derivative action must satisfy a number of statutory prerequisites and
must obtain the leave of the court before proceeding. 26 No such pre-
requisites exist with the oppression remedy and leave is not required to
bring an application. Finally, the remedies available are much broader
under the oppression remedy. 27
The broad sweep of the oppression remedy means that the rela-
tionship between it and other statutory remedies can be a cause for
concern. In relation to winding-up applications, the oppression remedy
has not been a problem, as the relevant legislative provisions have been
drafted with the intention of largely integrating the two remedies.
1 28
The relationship between appraisal rights and the oppression remedy
also has been relatively trouble-free. The fact that appraisal rights can
be exercised in situations when the oppression remedy might be availa-
ble is undisputed. A potentially more contentious problem is whether
the oppression remedy should be available when appraisal rights can be
utilized or have been exercised. In the United States it has been sug-
gested in some cases that the existence of appraisal rights precludes
reliance on other remedies. There has been no indication, however,
from Canadian courts that the possibility of relying on appraisal rights
will bar an application under the oppression remedy. 2 Indeed, though
124. It has been held that any shareholder seeking to pursue a derivative action
must comply with the statutory requirements and obtain the leave of the court. Farn-
ham v. Fingold, [1973] 2 O.R. 132 (Ont. C.A.). On the courts' liberal approach to the
derivative action requirements, see Beck, supra note 2, at 335-37; HADDEN, supra note
4, at 270-73; WELLING, supra note 4, at 502-17; Re Northwest Forest Prods. Ltd.,
[1975] 4 W.W.R. 724 (B.C.S.C.); Armstrong v. Gardner, 20 O.R.2d 648 (Ont. H.C.
1978); Re Bellman and Western Approaches Ltd., 33 B.C.L.R. 45 (B.C.C.A. 1981).
But see Maloney, supra note 14, at 340-41; Re Daon Dev. Corp., 54 B.C.L.R. 235
(B.C.S.C. 1984).
125. See, e.g., Sparling v. Javelin Int'l Ltd., [1986] R.J.Q. 1073 (Que. S.C.); Re
Peterson and Kanata Invs. Ltd., 60 D.L.R.3d 527 (B.C.S.C. 1975); Redekop v. Robco
Constr. Ltd., 89 D.L.R.3d 507 (B.C.S.C. 1978); Waldron, supra note 16, at 137-41;
Schaef, supra note 24, at 519-20.
126. See supra note 14.
127. See Beck, supra note 2, at 318; Waldron, supra note 16, at 142; Ravinsky,
supra note 16, at 53.
128. DICKERSON REPORT, supra note 5, at 150-51, 162. See also supra note
122.
129. On the U.S. law, see, for example, O'NEAL & THOMPSON, supra note 3, at
para. 5.32.
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there is some conflict on the point, it appears that even after requesting
that the corporation purchase his or her shares under the appraisal
rights provision, a shareholder can apply under the oppression remedy.
This is the case even though it is provided by statute that a shareholder
who utilizes appraisal rights loses his rights as a shareholder.3
The interrelationship between the oppression remedy and the stat-
utory derivative action is more of a problem. There have been isolated
suggestions in the case law that certain allegations constitute wrongs to
the corporation and thus are not the proper subject matter of an op-
pression application.""1 Similarly, there is some academic support for
the view that boundaries should be drawn around the oppression rem-
edy by requiring certain matters be dealt with by way of a derivative
action rather than the oppression remedy.1"2
It would be unfortunate if these suggestions were taken up by the
Canadian judiciary. Before the statutory reforms of the 1970s, Cana-
dian courts had to struggle with the complicated question of whether a
particular action constituted a wrong to the corporation or a wrong to a
shareholder in his or her individual capacity. 3 If the requirement of
using a derivative action is used to impose limits on the oppression
remedy, the courts will have to engage in similar linedrawing. The
courts have shown that they can limit the oppression remedy without
the use of such devices. Consequently, using the derivative action to
limit the oppression remedy would likely add unnecessary complexity
to the law and might impose crippling procedural barriers around the
oppression remedy.13 4 Fortunately, most Canadian judges have not
troubled themselves with the potential complications arising from the
relationship between the derivative action and the oppression remedy.
Further, among those who have, there is a significant degree of support
for the view that the availability of a derivative action should not affect
130. Dicta in McConnell v. Newco Fin. Corp., 8 B.L.R. 180 (B.C.S.C. 1979),
indicated that an oppression application could not be brought if appraisal rights had
been validly exercised. However, it was held in Re Brant Invs. Ltd., 44 O.R.2d 201
(Ont. H.C. 1983), and Brant Invs. Ltd. v. Keeprite Inc., 37 B.L.R. 65 (Ont. H.C.
1987), that an application could be brought. The provision involved in all three cases
was § 190(11) of the C.B.C.A.. There are analogous provisions under the statutes
modeled after the C.B.C.A., though the position differs somewhat under the A.B.C.A.
See A.B.C.A., supra note 6, at § 184 (14)-(16).
131. Johnston v. West Fraser Timber Co., 17 B.L.R. 16 (B.C.S.C. 1981), rev'd,
133 D.L.R.3d 77 (B.C.C.A. 1982)(on appeal); Re Goldstream Resources Ltd., 2
B.C.L.R.2d 244 (B.C.S.C. 1986).
132. BUCKLEY & CONNELLY, supra note 52, at 524, 677-78.
133. See, e.g., Beck, supra note 10, at 581-89.
134. On this line of reasoning, see generally HADDEN, supra note 4, at 264-65;
ALBERTA REPORT, supra note 5, at 142-43; Waldron, supra note 16, at 150-52.
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the disposal of an oppression application.1"'
4.2. United States
The Canadian experience suggests that if U.S. legislators and
courts expand the scope and operation of statutory dissolution/oppres-
sion provisions, the interrelationship between various shareholders'
remedies will become a source of concern. Indeed, the problem may be
worse in the United States, as minority shareholders have historically
had greater access to remedies than has been the case in Canada. For
example, in contrast to Canada, in the United States the derivative ac-
tion has been an important and effective shareholders' remedy for a
significant period of time. The more established status of the derivative
action may well make the task of reconciling the derivative action with
a broader form of oppression remedy more difficult than in Canada. In
Canada, judges simply have to consider the relationship between two
statutory provisions which are in the same statute and which were in-
troduced at the same time. In the United States, on the other hand, the
judiciary would be faced with considering the relationship between fed-
eral and state rules of procedure, statutory provisions in the state incor-
poration code and a substantial body of common law surrounding these
provisions.
1
3
6
It may be that these potential difficulties with the derivative action
are overstated. Derivative actions and applications under dissolution/
oppression provisions have been brought simultaneously in a number of
U.S. cases without any difficulty.13 Nevertheless, Sax v. World Wide
Press Inc.1"8 indicates that the relationship between the derivative ac-
tion and dissolution/oppression provisions may indeed become more
troublesome in the future. In Sax, an application brought under the
Montana dissolution/oppression provision was dismissed on the basis
135. Sparling v. Javelin Int'l Ltd., [19861 R.J.Q. 1073, 1123-25 (Que. S.C.); Re
Peterson and Kanata Invs. Ltd., 60 D.L.R.3d 527, 544 (B.C.S.C. 1975).
136. On the U.S. law relating to the derivative action, see 12B C. VAN SWEAR-
INGEN, FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS 1 5907-
09, 5911, 5915, 5923 (1984); 13 C. VAN SWEARINGEN, FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF
THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS 1 5939-6045 (1984).
137. See, e.g., Meiselman v. Meiselman, 307 S.E.2d 551 (1983); Gimpel v.
Bolestein, 477 N.Y.S.2d 1014 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1984). Because of the possibility of over-
lap, HAYNSWORTH, supra note 99, at 295 n.259, recommends alleging multiple causes
of action. See also Masinter v. WEBCO Company, 262 S.E.2d 433 (W. Va. 1980). In
that case, the court held that an action could be brought by an individual shareholder
on the basis of oppressive conduct even though the relevant statutory dissolution provi-
sion did not refer to such conduct. It was also held that an application based on an
allegation of oppression would most often be individual rather than derivative in
nature.
138. 809 F.2d 610 (9th Cir. 1987).
[Vol. 10:3
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol10/iss3/1
OPPRESSION REMEDY: CANADIAN LAW
that the facts alleged, even if proved, constituted wrongs to the corpora-
tion rather than breaches of personal rights of the applicant. The court
said that an application could only be made under the Montana disso-
lution/oppression provision if the personal rights of the applicant were
affected. The court expressly stated that a beneficial effect of requiring
applications under the dissolution/oppression provision to involve con-
duct affecting the personal rights of the shareholder would be that ap-
plications under the provision would be reduced. If this line of reason-
ing gains judicial support in the future, attempts to expand the
operation of American dissolution/oppression provisions will be signifi-
cantly hindered, unless the relevant statutory provisions are drafted to
take into account the relationship with derivative actions.
Another potentially troublesome area is shareholders' duties. In
Canada, integration of common law duties owed by shareholders to
other shareholders with the oppression remedy is not a problem be-
cause, as mentioned, the general rule is that shareholders do not owe
duties directly to other shareholders."3 9 Indeed, a strong case can be
made that such duties should not be introduced into Canadian law be-
cause conduct which would be encompassed by such duties is already
dealt with by the oppression remedy.' 4 In the United States, however,
it is accepted in most jurisdictions that shareholders owe duties directly
to other shareholders, at least in closely held corporations.' 4 ' Conse-
quently, if the operation of statutory dissolution/oppression provisions
is expanded in the future, care will have to be taken to ensure that
139. On the basic position that shareholders do not owe duties directly to other
shareholders, see Brant Invs. Ltd. v. Keeprite Inc., 37 B.L.R. 65, 100-01 (Ont. H.C.
1987); Re Little Billy's Restaurant, 45 B.C.L.R. 388, 392-93 (B.C.S.C. 1983). Duties
may be owed directly to shareholders in special circumstances such as some share trans-
actions. Dusik v. Newton, 62 B.C.L.R. 1 (B.C.C.A. 1985).
140. See WELLING supra note 4, at 593-608. But see M. ELLIS, FIDUCIARY
DUTIES IN CANADA 18-6 - 18-7 (1988).
On whether the oppression remedy covers conduct constituting breaches of duties
owed by shareholders, see, for example, MacMillan v. Progressive Mill Supplies Ltd.,
6 B.C.L.R.2d 135 (B.C.C.A. 1986) (relief granted in circumstances very similar to
those in perhaps the leading U.S. shareholders' duty case, Donahue v. Rodd Elec-
trotype, 328 N.E.2d 505 (Mass. 1975)). See also Beck, supra note 2, at 316-17, 319-
20; Anisman, supra note 10, at 492-93; Waldron, supra note 16, at 144-46. It is diffi-
cult to state definitively whether the oppression remedy covers all conduct which would
be a breach of duties owed by shareholders to other shareholders. For example, in both
Brant Invs. Ltd. v. Keeprite Inc., 37 B.L.R. 65 (Ont. H.C. 1987) and Re Little Billy's
Restaurant, 45 B.C.L.R. 388 (B.C.S.C. 1983), it seemed to be assumed that, if share-
holders owed duties directly to other shareholders, these duties would be strict fiduciary
duties. This does not appear to be the law in most jurisdictions in the United States.
See, e.g., Hochstetler & Svejda, supra note 46, at 928-30.
141. The nature and scope of these duties is widely discussed. See, e.g., Olson,
supra note 1, at 648-55; Leacock, Close Corporations and Private Companies Under
American and English Law: Protecting Minorities, 14 LAw. AM. 557 (1983).
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these provisions are integrated properly with the common law duties
existing between shareholders.
The necessity of careful integration is demonstrated by Sund-
berg.142 In that case, the applicants argued that the conduct of the con-
trollers of the corporation gave rise to a buyout right not only under
Minnesota's oppression remedy, but under the common law duties
owed by controlling shareholders to minority shareholders. The court
held, however, that the applicant could not rely on the common law of
corporations because the circumstances in which aggrieved shareholders
could have their shares bought out was codified under the Minnesota
oppression remedy. As mentioned, the right to be bought out is re-
stricted under the Minnesota provision to corporations with thirty-five
shareholders and the corporation involved did not meet this numerical
limit, even though it had some of the characteristics present under the
common law definition of closely held corporation. Consequently, be-
cause of the drafting of the Minnesota oppression provision the appli-
cants were denied a remedy that they might otherwise have had under
the common law relating to duties owed to shareholders. This case
demonstrates that in the United States care will have to be taken in the
future to ensure that the integration of duties owed to shareholders and
dissolution/oppression provisions advances, rather than frustrates, the
underlying purpose of both areas of the law: the protection of minority
shareholders.
5. CONCLUSION
Canada's experience with a broadly drafted oppression remedy, on
the whole, has been a good one. Protection of min6rity shareholders
was a significant problem before the statutory reforms of the 1970s and
early 1980s. While a variety of provisions were introduced to aid mi-
nority shareholders, the oppression remedy has emerged as the most
important. Successful applications have been made in a wide variety of
situations, and courts have granted a fairly broad range of remedies.
This has been beneficial not only for litigants, but also for minority
shareholders who have relied on negotiation rather than the courts. The
threat of the remedy is a valuable bargaining chip which makes it eas-
ier for the minority to obtain a satisfactory settlement.
The success of the oppression remedy in Canada can be attributed
in large part to its open-ended nature. The oppression remedy was
drafted with the intention of eliminating procedural obstacles, and the
courts have generally resisted attempts to impose categorical bars on
142. See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
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access to the remedy. This has allowed the oppression remedy to oper-
ate in a wide variety of circumstances. Nevertheless, the courts have not
allowed applicants to use the oppression remedy to run roughshod over
the normal operations of corporations. The courts, instead, have im-
posed sensible limits on the remedy on a case by case basis. The failure
to develop a theoretical framework to govern when applications will be
successful is perhaps regrettable, but, as of yet, has not seriously inter-
fered with the satisfactory operation of the oppression remedy.
In the United States, as in Canada, concerns have been expressed
about the protection of minority shareholders. 4" The Canadian experi-
ence would seem to provide a strong endorsement for the adoption of a
broad oppression remedy as a solution to these problems. Any such en-
dorsement, however, would have to be carefully qualified. In Canada,
the oppression remedy was introduced as part of substantial corporate
law reform affecting all areas of corporation law. It was probably evi-
dent to judges that existing corporate law principles were to be sub-
jected to critical re-examination. Consequently, Canadian judges gener-
ally have had few difficulties accepting that the oppression remedy has
altered their role in supervising corporate affairs. In the United States,
however, a new, broadly drafted oppression remedy would most likely
be introduced as an isolated statutory provision. Judges and lawyers
would thus have to struggle to integrate the new open-ended oppression
remedy with existing corporate law concepts and principles. The diffi-
culties which have arisen in cases involving the derivative action and
shareholders' duties indicate that the problems of integration should not
be understated. If these problems can be overcome, however, the Cana-
dian experience indicates that the introduction of an open-ended op-
pression remedy would be a beneficial step forward in U.S. corporate
law.
143. The literature is substantial. A good survey is provided in O'NEAL &
THOMPSON, supra note 3, at ch. 10. See also supra note 1.
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